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Page 20
(179) The falsity of such a doctrine is shown in this very chapter, for we
have shown both by reason and examples that the meaning of Scripture is only
made plain through Scripture itself, and even in questions deducible from
ordinary knowledge should be looked for from no other source.
(180) Lastly, such a theory supposes that we may explain the words of
Scripture according to our preconceived opinions, twisting them about, and
reversing or completely changing the literal sense, however plain it may be.
(181) Such licence is utterly opposed to the teaching of this and the
preceding chapters, and, moreover, will be evident to everyone as rash and
excessive.
(182) But if we grant all this licence, what can it effect after all?
Absolutely nothing. (183) Those things which cannot be demonstrated, and
which make up the greater part of Scripture, cannot be examined by reason,
and cannot therefore be explained or interpreted by this rule; whereas,
on the contrary, by following our own method, we can explain many questions
of this nature, and discuss them on a sure basis, as we have already shown,
by reason and example. (184) Those matters which are by their nature
comprehensible we can easily explain, as has been pointed out, simply by
means of the context.
(185) Therefore, the method of Maimonides is clearly useless: to which we
may add, that it does away with all the certainty which the masses acquire
by candid reading, or which is gained by any other persons in any other way.
(186) In conclusion, then, we dismiss Maimonides' theory as harmful,
useless, and absurd.
(187) As to the tradition of the Pharisees, we have already shown that it is
not consistent, while the authority of the popes of Rome stands in need of
more credible evidence; the latter, indeed, I reject simply on this ground,
for if the popes could point out to us the meaning of Scripture as surely as
did the high priests of the Jews, I should not be deterred by the fact that
there have been heretic and impious Roman pontiffs; for among the Hebrew
high-priests of old there were also heretics and impious men who gained the
high- priesthood by improper means, but who, nevertheless, had Scriptural
sanction for their supreme power of interpreting the law. (See
Deut. xvii:11, 12, and xxxiii:10, also Malachi ii:8.)
(188) However, as the popes can show no such sanction, their authority
remains open to very grave doubt, nor should anyone be deceived by the
example of the Jewish high-priests and think that the Catholic religion also
stands in need of a pontiff; he should bear in mind that the laws of Moses
being also the ordinary laws of the country, necessarily required some
public authority to insure their observance; for, if everyone were free to
interpret the laws of his country as he pleased, no state could stand, but
would for that very reason be dissolved at once, and public rights would
become private rights.
(189) With religion the case is widely different. Inasmuch as it consists
not so much in outward actions as in simplicity and truth of character, it
stands outside the sphere of law and public authority. (190) Simplicity and
truth of character are not produced by the constraint of laws, nor by
the authority of the state, no one the whole world over can be forced or
legislated into a state of blessedness; the means required for such a
consummation are faithful and brotherly admonition, sound education, and,
above all, free use of the individual judgment.
(191) Therefore, as the supreme right of free thinking, even on religion, is
in every man's power, and as it is inconceivable that such power could be
alienated, it is also in every man's power to wield the supreme right and
authority of free judgment in this behalf, and to explain and interpret
religion for himself. (192) The only reason for vesting the supreme
authority in the interpretation of law, and judgment on public affairs in
the hands of the magistrates, is that it concerns questions of public right.
(193) Similarly the supreme authority in explaining religion, and in passing
judgment thereon, is lodged with the individual because it concerns
questions of individual right. (194) So far, then, from the authority of the
Hebrew high-priests telling in confirmation of the authority of the Roman
pontiffs to interpret religion, it would rather tend to establish individual
freedom of judgment. (195) Thus in this way also, we have shown that our
method of interpreting Scripture is the best. (196) For as the highest power
of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man, the rule for such
interpretation should be nothing but the natural light of reason which is
common to all - not any supernatural light nor any external authority;
moreover, such a rule ought not to be so difficult that it can only be
applied by very skilful philosophers, but should be adapted to the natural
and ordinary faculties and capacity of mankind. (197) And such I have shown
our method to be, for such difficulties as it has arise from men's
carelessness, and are no part of its nature.
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