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Page 19
(157) The opinion of Maimonides was widely different. (158) He asserted
that each passage in Scripture admits of various, nay, contrary,
meanings; but that we could never be certain of any particular one till we
knew that the passage, as we interpreted it, contained nothing contrary or
repugnant to reason. (159) If the literal meaning clashes with reason,
though the passage seems in itself perfectly clear, it must be interpreted
in some metaphorical sense. (160) This doctrine he lays down very plainly in
chap. xxv. part ii. of his book, "More Nebuchim," for he says: "Know that we
shrink not from affirming that the world hath existed from eternity,
because of what Scripture saith concerning the world's creation. (161) For
the texts which teach that the world was created are not more in number than
those which teach that God hath a body; neither are the approaches in this
matter of the world's creation closed, or even made hard to us: so that we
should not be able to explain what is written, as we did when we showed
that God hath no body, nay, peradventure, we could explain and make fast the
doctrine of the world's eternity more easily than we did away with the
doctrines that God hath a beatified body. (162) Yet two things hinder me
from doing as I have said, and believing that the world is eternal.
(163) As it hath been clearly shown that God hath not a body, we must
perforce explain all those passages whereof the literal sense agreeth not
with the demonstration, for sure it is that they can be so explained. (164)
But the eternity of the world hath not been so demonstrated, therefore
it is not necessary to do violence to Scripture in support of some common
opinion, whereof we might, at the bidding of reason, embrace the contrary."
(165) Such are the words of Maimonides, and they are evidently sufficient to
establish our point: for if he had been convinced by reason that the world
is eternal, he would not have hesitated to twist and explain away the words
of Scripture till he made them appear to teach this doctrine. (166) He would
have felt quite sure that Scripture, though everywhere plainly denying the
eternity of the world, really intends to teach it. (167) So that, however
clear the meaning of Scripture may be, he would not feel certain of having
grasped it, so long as he remained doubtful of the truth of what, was
written. (168) For we are in doubt whether a thing is in conformity with
reason, or contrary thereto, so long as we are uncertain of its truth,
and, consequently, we cannot be sure whether the literal meaning of a
passage be true or false.
(169) If such a theory as this were sound, I would certainly grant that some
faculty beyond the natural reason is required for interpreting Scripture.
(170) For nearly all things that we find in Scripture cannot be inferred
from known principles of the natural reason, and, therefore, we should be
unable to come to any conclusion about their truth, or about the real
meaning and intention of Scripture, but should stand in need of some
further assistance.
(171) Further, the truth of this theory would involve that the masses,
having generally no comprehension of, nor leisure for, detailed proofs,
would be reduced to receiving all their knowledge of Scripture on the
authority and testimony of philosophers, and, consequently, would be
compelled to suppose that the interpretations given by philosophers were
infallible.
(172) Truly this would be a new form of ecclesiastical authority, and a new
sort of priests or pontiffs, more likely to excite men's ridicule than their
veneration. (173) Certainly our method demands a knowledge of Hebrew for
which the masses have no leisure; but no such objection as the foregoing can
be brought against us. (174) For the ordinary Jews or Gentiles, to whom the
prophets and apostles preached and wrote, understood the language, and,
consequently, the intention of the prophet or apostle addressing them; but
they did not grasp the intrinsic reason of what was preached, which,
according to Maimonides, would be necessary for an understanding of it.
(175) There is nothing, then, in our method which renders it necessary that
the masses should follow the testimony of commentators, for I point to a set
of unlearned people who understood the language of the prophets and
apostles; whereas Maimonides could not point to any such who could arrive at
the prophetic or apostolic meaning through their knowledge of the causes
of things.
(176) As to the multitude of our own time, we have shown that whatsoever is
necessary to salvation, though its reasons may be unknown, can easily be
understood in any language, because it is thoroughly ordinary and usual; it
is in such understanding as this that the masses acquiesce, not in the
testimony of commentators; with regard to other questions, the ignorant and
the learned fare alike.
(177) But let us return to the opinion of Maimonides, and examine it more
closely. In the first place, he supposes that the prophets were in entire
agreement one with another, and that they were consummate philosophers and
theologians; for he would have them to have based their conclusions on the
absolute truth. (178) Further, he supposes that the sense of Scripture
cannot be made plain from Scripture itself, for the truth of things is not
made plain therein (in that it does not prove any thing, nor teach the
matters of which it speaks through their definitions and first causes),
therefore, according to Maimonides, the true sense of Scripture cannot be
made plain from itself, and must not be there sought.
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