Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1 by Benedictus de Spinoza


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Page 27

(30) Hither, then, our highest good and our highest blessedness aim -
namely, to the knowledge and love of God; therefore the means demanded by
this aim of all human actions, that is, by God in so far as the idea of him
is in us, may be called the commands of God, because they proceed, as it
were, from God Himself, inasmuch as He exists in our minds, and the plan of
life which has regard to this aim may be fitly called the law of God.

(31) The nature of the means, and the plan of life which this aim demands,
how the foundations of the best states follow its lines, and how men's life
is conducted, are questions pertaining to general ethics. (32) Here I only
proceed to treat of the Divine law in a particular application.

(33) As the love of God is man's highest happiness and blessedness, and the
ultimate end and aim of all human actions, it follows that he alone lives by
the Divine law who loves God not from fear of punishment, or from love of
any other object, such as sensual pleasure, fame, or the like; but solely
because he has knowledge of God, or is convinced that the knowledge and love
of God is the highest good. (34) The sum and chief precept, then, of the
Divine law is to love God as the highest good, namely, as we have said, not
from fear of any pains and penalties, or from the love of any other object
in which we desire to take pleasure. (35) The idea of God lays down
the rule that God is our highest good - in other words, that the knowledge
and love of God is the ultimate aim to which all our actions should be
directed. (36) The worldling cannot understand these things, they appear
foolishness to him. because he has too meager a knowledge of God, and also
because in this highest good he can discover nothing which he can handle or
eat, or which affects the fleshly appetites wherein he chiefly delights, for
it consists solely in thought and the pure reason. (37) They, on the other
hand, who know that they possess no greater gift than intellect and sound
reason, will doubtless accept what I have said without question.

(38) We have now explained that wherein the Divine law chiefly consists, and
what are human laws, namely, all those which have a different aim
unless they have been ratified by revelation, for in this respect also
things are referred to God (as we have shown above) and in this sense the
law of Moses, although it was not universal, but entirely adapted to the
disposition and particular preservation of a single people, may yet be
called a law of God or Divine law, inasmuch as we believe that it was
ratified by prophetic insight. (39) If we consider the nature of natural
Divine law as we have just explained it, we shall see:

(40) I.- That it is universal or common to all men, for we have deduced it from universal human
nature.

(41) II. That it does not depend on the truth of any historical narrative
whatsoever, for inasmuch as this natural Divine law is comprehended solely
by the consideration of human nature, it is plain that we can conceive it as
existing as well in Adam as in any other man, as well in a man living among
his fellows, as in a man who lives by himself.

(42) The truth of a historical narrative, however assured, cannot give us
the knowledge nor consequently the love of God, for love of God springs from
knowledge of Him, and knowledge of Him should be derived from general ideas,
in themselves certain and known, so that the truth of a historical narrative
is very far from being a necessary requisite for our attaining our highest
good.

(43) Still, though the truth of histories cannot give us the knowledge and
love of God, I do not deny that reading them is very useful with a view to
life in the world, for the more we have observed and known of men's customs
and circumstances, which are best revealed by their actions, the more warily
we shall be able to order our lives among them, and so far as reason
dictates to adapt our actions to their dispositions.

(44) III. We see that this natural Divine law does not demand the
performance of ceremonies - that is, actions in themselves indifferent,
which are called good from the fact of their institution, or actions
symbolizing something profitable for salvation, or (if one prefers this
definition) actions of which the meaning surpasses human understanding. (45)
The natural light of reason does not demand anything which it is itself
unable to supply, but only such as it can very clearly show to be good, or a
means to our blessedness. (46) Such things as are good simply because they
have been commanded or instituted, or as being symbols of something good,
are mere shadows which cannot be reckoned among actions that are the
offsprings as it were, or fruit of a sound mind and of intellect. (47) There
is no need for me to go into this now in more detail.

(48) IV. Lastly, we see that the highest reward of the Divine law is the law
itself, namely, to know God and to love Him of our free choice, and with an
undivided and fruitful spirit; while its penalty is the absence of these
things, and being in bondage to the flesh - that is, having an inconstant
and wavering spirit.

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