Theologico-Political Treatise — Part 1 by Benedictus de Spinoza


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Page 26

(1.) (7) Because man, in so far as he is a part of nature, constitutes a
part of the power of nature. (8) Whatever, therefore, follows necessarily
from the necessity of human nature (that is, from nature herself, in so far
as we conceive of her as acting through man) follows, even though it be
necessarily, from human power. (9) Hence the sanction of such laws may very
well be said to depend on man's decree, for it principally depends on the
power of the human mind; so that the human mind in respect to its perception
of things as true and false, can readily be conceived as without such laws,
but not without necessary law as we have just defined it.

(2.) (10) I have stated that these laws depend on human decree because it is
well to define and explain things by their proximate causes. (11) The
general consideration of fate and the concatenation of causes would aid us
very little in forming and arranging our ideas concerning particular
questions. (12) Let us add that as to the actual coordination and
concatenation of things, that is how things are ordained and linked
together, we are obviously ignorant; therefore, it is more profitable for
right living, nay, it is necessary for us to consider things as contingent.
(13) So much about law in the abstract.

(14) Now the word law seems to be only applied to natural phenomena by
analogy, and is commonly taken to signify a command which men can either
obey or neglect, inasmuch as it restrains human nature within certain
originally exceeded limits, and therefore lays down no rule beyond human
strength. (15) Thus it is expedient to define law more particularly as a
plan of life laid down by man for himself or others with a certain object.

(16) However, as the true object of legislation is only perceived by a few,
and most men are almost incapable of grasping it, though they live under its
conditions, legislators, with a view to exacting general obedience, have
wisely put forward another object, very different from that which
necessarily follows from the nature of law: they promise to the observers of
the law that which the masses chiefly desire, and threaten its violators
with that which they chiefly fear: thus endeavouring to restrain the masses,
as far as may be, like a horse with a curb; whence it follows that the word
law is chiefly applied to the modes of life enjoined on men by the sway of
others; hence those who obey the law are said to live under it and to be
under compulsion. (17) In truth, a man who renders everyone their due
because he fears the gallows, acts under the sway and compulsion of others,
and cannot be called just. (18) But a man who does the same from a knowledge
of the true reason for laws and their necessity, acts from a firm purpose
and of his own accord, and is therefore properly called just. (19) This, I
take it, is Paul's meaning when he says, that those who live under the law
cannot be justified through the law, for justice, as commonly defined, is
the constant and perpetual will to render every man his due. (20) Thus
Solomon says (Prov. xxi:15), "It is a joy to the just to do judgment," but
the wicked fear.

(21) Law, then, being a plan of living which men have for a certain object
laid down for themselves or others, may, as it seems, be divided into human
law and Divine law. {But both are opposite sides of the same coin}

(22) By human law I mean a plan of living which serves only to render life
and the state secure. (23) By Divine law I mean that which only regards the
highest good, in other words, the true knowledge of God and love.

(24) I call this law Divine because of the nature of the highest good, which
I will here shortly explain as clearly as I can.

(25) Inasmuch as the intellect is the best part of our being, it is evident
that we should make every effort to perfect it as far as possible if we
desire to search for what is really profitable to us. (26) For in
intellectual perfection the highest good should consist. (27) Now, since all
our knowledge, and the certainty which removes every doubt, depend solely on
the knowledge of God;- firstly, because without God nothing can exist or be
conceived; secondly, because so long as we have no clear and distinct idea
of God we may remain in universal doubt - it follows that our highest good
and perfection also depend solely on the knowledge of God. (28) Further,
since without God nothing can exist or be conceived, it is evident that all
natural phenomena involve and express the conception of God as far as their
essence and perfection extend, so that we have greater and more perfect
knowledge of God in proportion to our knowledge of natural phenomena:
conversely (since the knowledge of an effect through its cause is the same
thing as the knowledge of a particular property of a cause) the greater our
knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge of the
essence of God (which is the cause of all things). (29) So, then, our
highest good not only depends on the knowledge of God, but wholly consists
therein; and it further follows that man is perfect or the reverse in
proportion to the nature and perfection of the object of his special desire;
hence the most perfect and the chief sharer in the highest blessedness is he
who prizes above all else, and takes especial delight in, the intellectual
knowledge of God, the most perfect Being.

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