History of the World War, Vol. 3 by Richard J. Beamish and Francis A. March


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Page 45

General Lake says: "Persistent and repeated attempts on both banks have
thus failed, and it was known that at the outside not more than six
days' supplies remained to the Kut garrison. The British troops were
nearly worn out. The same troops had advanced time and again to assault
positions strong by art and held by a determined enemy. For eighteen
consecutive days they had done all that men could do to overcome, not
only the enemy, but also exceptional climatic and physical obstacles,
and this on a scale of rations which was far from being sufficient in
view of the exertions they had undergone but which the shortage of river
transports, had made it impossible to augment. The need for rest was
imperative."

On April 28th the British garrison at Kut-el-Amara surrendered
unconditionally, after a heroic resistance of a hundred and forty-three
days. According to British figures the surrendered army was composed of
2,970 English and 6,000 Indian troops. The Turkish figures are 13,300.
The Turks also captured a large amount of booty, although General
Townshend destroyed most of his guns and munitions.

During the period in which Kut-el-Amara was besieged by the Turks, the
British troops had suffered much. The enemy bombarded the town almost
every day, but did little damage. The real foe was starvation. At first
the British were confident that a relief expedition would soon reach
them, and they amused themselves by cricket and hockey and fishing in
the river. By early February, however, it was found necessary to reduce
the rations, and a month later they were suffering from hunger. Some
little help was given them by airplanes, which brought tobacco and some
small quantities of supplies. Soon the horses and the mules were
slaughtered and eaten. As time went on the situation grew desperate;
till almost the end, however, they did not lose hope. Through the
wireless they were informed about the progress of the relief expeditions
and had even heard their guns in the distance. They gradually grew,
however, weaker and weaker, so that on the surrender the troops in the
first lines were too weak to march back with their kits.

The Turks treated the prisoners in a chivalric manner; food and tobacco
was at once distributed, and all were interned in Anatolia, except
General Townshend and his staff, who were taken to Constantinople. Later
on it was General Townshend who was to have the honor of carrying the
Turkish plea for an armistice in the closing days of the war.

The surrender of Kut created a world-wide sensation. The loss of eight
thousand troops was, of course, not a serious matter, and the road to
India was still barred, but the moral effect was most unfortunate. That
the great British nation, whose power had been so respected in the
Orient, should now be forced to yield, was a great blow to its prestige.
In England, of course, there was a flood of criticism. It was very plain
that a mistake had been made. A commission was appointed to inquire into
the whole business. This committee reported to Parliament on June 26,
1917, and the report created a great sensation. The substance of the
report was, that while the expedition was justifiable from a political
point of view, it was undertaken with insufficient forces and inadequate
preparation, and it sharply criticized those that were responsible.

It seems plain that the military authorities in India under-estimated
their opponent. The report especially criticized General Sir John Eccles
Nixon, the former commander of the British forces in Mesopotamia, who
had urged the expedition, in spite of the objection of General
Townshend. Others sharing the blame were the Viceroy of India, Baron
Hardinge, General Sir Beauchamp Duff, Commander-in-Chief of the British
forces in India, and, in England, Major-General Sir Edmund Barrow,
Military Secretary of the India office, J. Austin Chamberlain, Secretary
for India, and the War Committee of the Cabinet. According to the
report, beside the losses incurred by the surrender more than
twenty-three thousand men were lost in the relieving expedition. The
general armament and equipment were declared to be not only
insufficient, but not up to the standard.

In consequence of this report Mr. Chamberlain resigned as secretary for
India. In the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, supported Lord Hardinge, who, at the time of the report, was
Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. He declared the criticism of Baron
Hardinge to be grossly unjust. After some discussion the House of
Commons supported Mr. Balfour's refusal to accept Baron Hardinge's
resignation, by a vote of 176 to 81. It seems to be agreed that the
civil administration of India were not responsible for the blunders of
the expedition. Ten years before, Lord Kitchener, after a bitter
controversy with Lord Curzon, had made the military side of the Indian
Government free of all civilian criticism and control. The blunders here
were military blunders.

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