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Page 44
For days the British troops bivouacked in driving rain on soaked and
sodden ground. Three times they were called upon to advance over a
perfectly flat country, deep in mud, and absolutely devoid of cover
against well-constructed and well-planned trenches, manned by a brave
and stubborn enemy, approximately their equal in numbers. They showed a
spirit of endurance and self-sacrifice of which their country may well
be proud.
But the repulse at Hanna did not discourage the British army. It was
decided to move up the left bank of the Tigris and attack the Turkish
position at the Dujailah redoubt. This meant a night march across the
desert with great danger that there would be no water supply and that,
unless the enemy was routed, the army would be in great danger.
General Lake says: "On the afternoon of March 7th, General Aylmer
assembled his subordinate commanders and gave his final instructions,
laying particular stress on the fact that the operation was designed to
effect a surprise, and that to prevent the enemy forestalling us, it was
essential that the first phase of the operation should be pushed through
with the utmost vigor. His dispositions were, briefly, as follows: The
greater part of a division under General Younghusband, assisted by naval
gunboats, controlled the enemy on the left bank. The remaining troops
were formed into two columns, under General Kemball and General Keary
respectively, a reserve of infantry, and the cavalry brigade, being held
at the Corps Commander's own disposal. Kemball's column covered on the
outer flank by the cavalry brigade was to make a turning movement to
attack the Dujailah redoubt from the south, supported by the remainder
of the force, operating from a position to the east of the redoubt. The
night march by this large force, which led across the enemy's front to a
position on his right flank, was a difficult operation, entailing
movement over unknown ground, and requiring most careful arrangement to
attain success."
Thanks to excellent staff work and good march discipline the troops
reached their allotted position apparently undiscovered by the enemy,
but while Keary's column was in position at daybreak, ready to support
Kemball's attack, the latter's command did not reach the point selected
for its deployment in the Dujailah depression until more than an hour
later. This delay was highly prejudicial to the success of the
operation.
When, nearly three hours later, Kemball's troops advanced to the attack,
they were strongly opposed by the enemy from trenches cleverly concealed
in the brushwood, and were unable to make further ground for some time,
though assisted by Keary's attack upon the redoubt from the east. The
southern attack was now reinforced, and by 1 P.M. had pushed forward to
within five hundred yards of the redoubt, but concealed trenches again
stopped further progress and the Turks made several counter-attacks with
reinforcements which had by now arrived from the direction of Magasis.
It was about this time that the Corps Commander received from his
engineer officers the unwelcome news that the water supply contained in
rain-water pools and in Dujailah depression, upon which he had reckoned,
was insufficient and could not be increased by digging. It was clear,
therefore, that unless the Dujailah redoubt could be carried that day
the scarcity of water would, of itself, compel the troops to fall back.
Preparations were accordingly made for a further assault on the redoubt,
and attacks were launched from the south and east under cover of a heavy
bombardment.
The attacking forces succeeded in gaining a foothold in the redoubt. But
here they were heavily counter-attacked by large enemy reinforcements,
and being subjected to an extremely rapid and accurate shrapnel fire
from concealed guns in the vicinity of Sinn After, they were forced to
fall back to the position from which they started. The troops who had
been under arms for some thirty hours, including a long night march,
were now much exhausted, and General Aylmer considered that a renewal of
the assault during the night could not be made with any prospect of
success. Next morning the enemy's position was found to be unchanged and
General Aylmer, finding himself faced with the deficiency of order
already referred to, decided upon the immediate withdrawal of his troops
to Wadi, which was reached the same night.
For the next month the English were held in their positions by the
Tigris floods. On April 4th the floods had sufficiently receded to
permit of another attack upon Umm-el-Hanna, which this time was
successful. On April 8th the Turkish position at Sanna-i-yat was
attacked, but the English were repulsed. They then determined to make
another attempt to capture the Sinn After redoubt. On April 17th the
fort of Beit-Aiessa, four miles from Es Sinn, on the left bank, was
captured after heavy bombardment, and held against serious
counter-attacks. On the 20th and 21st the Sanna-i-yat position was
bombarded and a vigorous assault was made, which met with some success.
The Turks, however, delivered a strong counter-attack, and succeeded in
forcing the British troops back.
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