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Page 39
"We have a treaty with Serbia. If we are honest we will leave nothing
undone to insure its fulfillment in letter and spirit. Only if we are
rogues may we find excuses to avoid our obligations."
Upon his first resignation M. Zaimis was appointed Premier, and declared
for a policy of armed neutrality. This position was sharply criticised
by Venizelos, but for a time became the policy of the Greek Government.
Meantime the Allied troops were arriving at Saloniki. On October 3d,
seventy thousand French troops arrived. A formal protest was made by the
Greek commandant, who then directed the harbor officials to assist in
arranging the landing. In a short time the Allied forces amounted to a
hundred and fifty thousand men, but the German campaign was moving
rapidly.
The German Balkan army captured Belgrade on the 9th of October, and by
that date two Bulgarian armies were on the Serbian frontier. Serbia
found herself opposed by two hundred thousand Austro-Germans and a
quarter of a million Bulgarians. Greece and Roumania fully mobilized and
were watching the conflict, and the small allied contingent at Saloniki
was preparing to march inland to the aid of Serbia.
The conduct of Greece on this occasion has led to universal criticism.
The King himself, no doubt, was mainly moved by his German wife and the
influence of his Imperial brother-in-law. Those that were associated
with him were probably moved by fear. They had been much impressed by
the strength of the German armies. They had seen the success of the
great German offensive in Russia, while the French and British were
being held in the West. They knew, too, the strength of Bulgaria. The
national characteristic of the Greeks is prudence, and it cannot be
denied that there was great reason to suppose that the armies of Greece
would not be able to resist the new attack. With these views Venizelos,
the greatest statesman that Greece had produced for many years, did not
agree, and the election seemed to show that he was supported by the
majority of the Greek people.
This was another case where the Allies, faced by a dangerous situation,
were acting with too great caution. In Gallipoli they had failed,
because at the very beginning they had not used their full strength.
Now, again, knowing as they did all that depended upon it, bound as they
were to the most loyal support of Serbia, the aid they sent was too
small to be more than a drop in the bucket. It must be remembered,
however, that the greatest leaders among the Allies were at all times
opposed to in any way scattering their strength. They believed that the
war was to be won in France. Military leaders in particular yielded
under protest to the political leaders when expeditions of this
character were undertaken.
Certainly this is true, that the world believed that Serbia had a right
to Allied assistance. The gallant little nation was fighting for her
life, and public honor demanded that she should be aided. It was this
strong feeling that led to the action that was taken, in spite of the
military opinions. It was, however, too late.
In the second week of October Serbia found herself faced by an enemy
which was attacking her on three sides. She herself had been greatly
weakened. Her losses in 1914, when she had driven Austria from her
border, must have been at least two hundred thousand men. She had
suffered from pestilence and famine. Her strength now could not have
been more than two hundred thousand, and though she was fairly well
supplied with munitions, she was so much outnumbered that she could
hardly hope for success. On her west she was facing the Austro-German
armies; on her east Bulgaria; on the south Albania. Her source of
supplies was Saloniki and this was really her only hope. If the Allies
at Saloniki could stop the Bulgarian movement, the Serbians might face
again the Austro-Germans. They expected this help from the Allies.
At Nish the town was decorated and the school children waited outside
the station with bouquets to present to the coming reinforcements. But
the Allies did not come.
Von Mackensen's plan was simple enough. His object was to win a way to
Constantinople. This could be done either by the control of the Danube
or the Ottoman Railroad. To control the Danube he had to seize
northeastern Serbia for the length of the river. This was comparatively
easy and would give him a clear water way to the Bulgarian railways
connected with Constantinople. The Ottoman railway was a harder route
to win. It meant an advance to the southeast, which would clear the
Moravo valley up to Nish, and then the Nishava valley up to Bulgaria.
The movements involved were somewhat complex, but easily carried out on
account of the very great numerical superiority of von Mackensen's
forces.
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