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Page 19
The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776
will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to
meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance. As
early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enlisted "for
the war." In a previous article, the policy of the Commander-in-chief
and of General Greene was noticed, and the formulated proposition, then
accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle. When the issue
ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force
before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man
who understood the exact issue. The temper of the British press, and
that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the
American Commander-in-chief. He knew that General Gage had urged that
"thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest
way to save blood and end the war." He also knew that when John Wesley
predicted that "neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would
suppress the rebellion," the British Cabinet had placed before
Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed
available for military purposes abroad. As early as May, 1776,
Washington was advised of the following facts:--
First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States,
including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal
a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.
Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective
force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall
below, forty thousand men.
The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed
operations were so closely defined and analyzed, that Washington had
full right to assume, as known, the strength of his adversary.
When, during May, 1776, the American Congress sent troops from New York
to Canada, he sharply protested, thus: "This diversion of forces will
endanger both enterprises; for Great Britain will attempt to capture New
York as well as Canada, if they have the men." He did not believe that
they would capture New York, if he could acquire and retain the force
which he demanded.
The point to be made emphatic, is this: That, from the date of the call
of Massachusetts, early in 1775, for thirty thousand men, up to the
occupation of New York, the force which he had the right to assume as at
his own disposal was equal to the contingencies of the conflict; and
that, when he did occupy New York, and begin its exterior defences at
Brooklyn, the British ministry had admitted its inability to send to
America a force sufficiently strong to capture the city. The maximum
force proposed was less than that which Congress could easily supply for
resistance. In other words, Washington would not have to fight Great
Britain, but a specific force; namely, all that Great Britain could
spare for that service; so that the issue was not between the new
Republic and England, but between the Republic and a single army, of
known elements and numbers. In fact, the opinion that France had already
made war upon England had so early gained credit, that Washington, while
still in New York, was forced to issue an order correcting the rumor,
and thus prevent undue confidence and its corresponding neglect to meet
the demands of the crisis.
Thus far, it is clear that there was nothing extravagant in the American
claim to independence; nor in the readiness of Washington to seize and
hold New York; nor in his belief that the colonial resources were equal
to the contest.
One other element is of determining value as to the necessity for his
occupation and defence of Brooklyn Heights. New York was the only base
from which Great Britain could operate against the colonies as an
organized State. By Long Island Sound and the Hudson River, her right
hand would hold New England under the guns of her warships, and by quick
occupation of Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and their tributary streams,
her left hand would cut off the South.
If the views of Lord Dartmouth had prevailed, in 1775, there would have
been no siege of Boston; but New York would have had a garrison fully
equal to its defence, while sparing troops for operations outside. But
the prompt occupation of New York, as the headquarters of revolution,
was a clear declaration to the world, and to the scattered people of the
colonies, that a new nation was asserting life, and that its soil was
free from a hostile garrison. The occupation of New York centralized, at
the social, commercial, and natural capital of the Republic, all
interests and resources, and gave to the struggle real force,
inspiration, and dignity.
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