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Page 18
If, on the other hand, Washington had secured the force which he
demanded from Congress, namely, fifty-eight thousand men, which was,
indeed (but too tardily), authorized, he could have met General Howe
upon terms of numerical equality, backed by breast-works, and have held
New York with an equal force.
This estimate, by Washington himself, of the contingencies of the
campaign, will have the greater significance when reference is made to
the details of British preparations in England.
While Congress did, indeed, as early as June, assign thirteen thousand
additional troops for the defence of New York, the peremptory detachment
of ten battalions to Canada, in addition to previous details,
persistently foiled every preparation to meet Howe with an adequate
force. Regiments from Connecticut and from other colonies reported with
a strength of only three hundred and sixty men. While the "paper
strength" of the army was far beyond its effective force, even the
"paper strength" was but one half of the force which the
Commander-in-chief had the right to assume as at his disposal.
Other facts fall in line just here.
At no later period of the war did either commander have under his
immediate control so large a nominal force as then. During but one year
of the succeeding struggle did the entire British army, from Halifax to
the West Indies inclusive (including foreign and provincial
auxiliaries), exceed, by more than seven thousand men, the force which
occupied both sides of the New York Narrows in 1776. The British Army at
that time, without its foreign contingent, would have been as inferior
to the force which had been ordered by Congress (and should have been
available) as the depleted American army of 1781 would have been
inferior to the British without the French contingent.
The largest continental force under arms, in any one year of the war,
did not greatly exceed forty thousand men, and the largest British
force, as late as 1781, including all arrivals, numbered, all told, but
forty-two thousand and seventy-five men.
The annual British average, including provincials, ranged from
thirty-three to thirty-eight thousand men. The physical agencies which
Great Britain employed were;, therefore, far beneath the prestige of her
accredited position among the nations; and the disparity between the
contending forces was mainly in discipline and equipment, with the
advantage to Great Britain in naval strength, until that was supplanted
by that of France.
To free the question from a popular fallacy which treats oldtime
operations as insignificant, in view of large modern armies and
campaigns, it is pertinent to state, just here, that the issues of the
battle-field for all time, up to the latest hour, have not been
determined by the size of armies, or by improvements in weapons of war,
except relatively, in proportion as civilized peoples fought those of
less civilization; or where some precocity of race or invention more
quickly matured the operations of the winning side.
If the maxims of Napoleon are but a terse restatement of those of
Caesar, and the skill of Hannibal at Cannae still holds place as a model
for the concave formation of a battle-line, so have all the decisive
battles of history taken shape from the timely handling of men, in the
exercise of that sound judgment which adapts means to ends, in every
work of life. Thus it is that equally great battles, those in the
highest sense great, have become memorial, although numbers did not
impart value to the struggle; but they were the expression of that skill
and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had
been greater or less.
If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in
1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower,
make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of
Napoleon at Waterloo.
If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against
few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical
fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by
General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect "parallels," and
thereby save a "regular approach." Numbers did not change relations, but
simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.
He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial
elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into
determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate
the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a
miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate
result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great. Washington did it.
His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a
conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of
his operations at and near New York will defy criticism. To hold the
facts of the issue discussed, right under the light on that military
science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with
physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the
necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in
1776.
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