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 Page 5
 
I draw my idea of the form of government from a principle in nature,
 
which no art can overturn, viz. that the more simple any thing is,
 
the less liable it is to be disordered; and the easier repaired
 
when disordered; and with this maxim in view, I offer a few remarks
 
on the so much boasted constitution of England.  That it was noble
 
for the dark and slavish times in which it was erected, is granted.
 
When the world was overrun with tyranny the least remove therefrom
 
was a glorious rescue.  But that it is imperfect, subject to convulsions,
 
and incapable of producing what it seems to promise, is easily demonstrated.
 
 
Absolute governments (tho' the disgrace of human nature) have this
 
advantage with them, that they are simple; if the people suffer,
 
they know the head from which their suffering springs, know likewise
 
the remedy, and are not bewildered by a variety of causes and cures.
 
But the constitution of England is so exceedingly complex,
 
that the nation may suffer for years together without being able to discover
 
in which part the fault lies; some will say in one and some in another,
 
and every political physician will advise a different medicine.
 
 
I know it is difficult to get over local or long standing prejudices,
 
yet if we will suffer ourselves to examine the component parts of the
 
English constitution, we shall find them to be the base remains of two
 
ancient tyrannies, compounded with some new republican materials.
 
 
 
FIRST - The remains of monarchial tyranny in the person of the king.
 
SECONDLY - The remains of aristocratical tyranny in the persons of the peers.
 
THIRDLY - The new republican materials in the persons of the commons,
 
          on whose virtue depends the freedom of England.
 
 
 
The two first, by being hereditary, are independent of the people;
 
wherefore in a CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE they contribute nothing towards
 
the freedom of the state.
 
 
To say that the constitution of England is a UNION of three powers
 
reciprocally CHECKING each other, is farcical, either the words have
 
no meaning, or they are flat contradictions.
 
 
To say that the commons is a check upon the king, presupposes two things:
 
 
FIRST - That the king is not to be trusted without being looked after,
 
or in other words, that a thirst for absolute power is the natural
 
disease of monarchy.
 
 
SECONDLY - That the commons, by being appointed for that purpose,
 
are either wiser or more worthy of confidence than the crown.
 
 
But as the same constitution which gives the commons a power to check
 
the king by withholding the supplies, gives afterwards the king a power
 
to check the commons, by empowering him to reject their other bills;
 
it again supposes that the king is wiser than those whom it has already
 
supposed to be wiser than him.  A mere absurdity!
 
 
There is something exceedingly ridiculous in the composition of monarchy;
 
it first excludes a man from the means of information, yet empowers him
 
to act in cases where the highest judgment is required.  The state of a king
 
shuts him from the world, yet the business of a king requires him to know
 
it thoroughly; wherefore the different parts, by unnaturally opposing
 
and destroying each other, prove the whole character to be absurd and useless.
 
 
Some writers have explained the English constitution thus: The king,
 
say they, is one, the people another; the peers are a house in behalf
 
of the king, the commons in behalf of the people; but this hath all
 
the distinctions of a house divided against itself; and though
 
the expressions be pleasantly arranged, yet when examined,
 
they appear idle and ambiguous; and it will always happen,
 
that the nicest construction that words are capable of,
 
when applied to the description of some thing which either
 
cannot exist, or is too incomprehensible to be within
 
the compass of description, will be words of sound only,
 
and though they may amuse the ear, they cannot inform the mind,
 
for this explanation includes a previous question, viz.
 
HOW CAME THE KING BY A POWER WHICH THE PEOPLE ARE AFRAID TO TRUST,
 
AND ALWAYS OBLIGED TO CHECK?  Such a power could not be the gift
 
of a wise people, neither can any power, WHICH NEEDS CHECKING,
 
be from God; yet the provision, which the constitution makes,
 
supposes such a power to exist.
 
 
But the provision is unequal to the task; the means either cannot
 
or will not accomplish the end, and the whole affair is a felo de se;
 
for as the greater weight will always carry up the less, and as all
 
the wheels of a machine are put in motion by one, it only remains to know
 
which power in the constitution has the most weight, for that will govern;
 
and though the others, or a part of them, may clog, or, as the phrase is,
 
check the rapidity of its motion, yet so long as they cannot stop it,
 
their endeavours will be ineffectual; the first moving power will
 
at last have its way, and what it wants in speed, is supplied by time.
 
 
         
        
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