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Page 23
What then is it which justifies virtue or the morally good
disposition, in making such lofty claims? It is nothing less than
the privilege it secures to the rational being of participating in the
giving of universal laws, by which it qualifies him to be a member
of a possible kingdom of ends, a privilege to which he was already
destined by his own nature as being an end in himself and, on that
account, legislating in the kingdom of ends; free as regards all
laws of physical nature, and obeying those only which he himself
gives, and by which his maxims can belong to a system of universal
law, to which at the same time he submits himself. For nothing has any
worth except what the law assigns it. Now the legislation itself which
assigns the worth of everything must for that very reason possess
dignity, that is an unconditional incomparable worth; and the word
respect alone supplies a becoming expression for the esteem which a
rational being must have for it. Autonomy then is the basis of the
dignity of human and of every rational nature.
The three modes of presenting the principle of morality that have
been adduced are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law,
and each of itself involves the other two. There is, however, a
difference in them, but it is rather subjectively than objectively
practical, intended namely to bring an idea of the reason nearer to
intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thereby nearer to
feeling. All maxims, in fact, have:
1. A form, consisting in universality; and in this view the
formula of the moral imperative is expressed thus, that the maxims
must be so chosen as if they were to serve as universal laws of
nature.
2. A matter, namely, an end, and here the formula says that the
rational being, as it is an end by its own nature and therefore an end
in itself, must in every maxim serve as the condition limiting all
merely relative and arbitrary ends.
3. A complete characterization of all maxims by means of that
formula, namely, that all maxims ought by their own legislation to
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of
nature. * There is a progress here in the order of the categories of
unity of the form of the will (its universality), plurality of the
matter (the objects, i.e., the ends), and totality of the system of
these. In forming our moral judgement of actions, it is better to
proceed always on the strict method and start from the general formula
of the categorical imperative: Act according to a maxim which can at
the same time make itself a universal law. If, however, we wish to
gain an entrance for the moral law, it is very useful to bring one and
the same action under the three specified conceptions, and thereby
as far as possible to bring it nearer to intuition.
* Teleology considers nature as a kingdom of ends; ethics regards a
possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom nature. In the first case, the
kingdom of ends is a theoretical idea, adopted to explain what
actually is. In the latter it is a practical idea, adopted to bring
about that which is not yet, but which can be realized by our conduct,
namely, if it conforms to this idea.
We can now end where we started at the beginning, namely, with the
conception of a will unconditionally good. That will is absolutely
good which cannot be evil- in other words, whose maxim, if made a
universal law, could never contradict itself. This principle, then, is
its supreme law: "Act always on such a maxim as thou canst at the same
time will to be a universal law"; this is the sole condition under
which a will can never contradict itself; and such an imperative is
categorical. Since the validity of the will as a universal law for
possible actions is analogous to the universal connexion of the
existence of things by general laws, which is the formal notion of
nature in general, the categorical imperative can also be expressed
thus: Act on maxims which can at the same time have for their object
themselves as universal laws of nature. Such then is the formula of an
absolutely good will.
Rational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this,
that it sets before itself an end. This end would be the matter of
every good will. But since in the idea of a will that is absolutely
good without being limited by any condition (of attaining this or that
end) we must abstract wholly from every end to be effected (since this
would make every will only relatively good), it follows that in this
case the end must be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as
an independently existing end. Consequently it is conceived only
negatively, i.e., as that which we must never act against and which,
therefore, must never be regarded merely as means, but must in every
volition be esteemed as an end likewise. Now this end can be nothing
but the subject of all possible ends, since this is also the subject
of a possible absolutely good will; for such a will cannot without
contradiction be postponed to any other object. The principle: "So act
in regard to every rational being (thyself and others), that he may
always have place in thy maxim as an end in himself," is accordingly
essentially identical with this other: "Act upon a maxim which, at the
same time, involves its own universal validity for every rational
being." For that in using means for every end I should limit my
maxim by the condition of its holding good as a law for every subject,
this comes to the same thing as that the fundamental principle of
all maxims of action must be that the subject of all ends, i.e., the
rational being himself, be never employed merely as means, but as
the supreme condition restricting the use of all means, that is in
every case as an end likewise.
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