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Page 11
* Just as pure mathematics are distinguished from applied, pure
logic from applied, so if we choose we may also distinguish pure
philosophy of morals (metaphysic) from applied (viz., applied to human
nature). By this designation we are also at once reminded that moral
principles are not based on properties of human nature, but must
subsist a priori of themselves, while from such principles practical
rules must be capable of being deduced for every rational nature,
and accordingly for that of man.
Such a metaphysic of morals, completely isolated, not mixed with any
anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics, and still less
with occult qualities (which we might call hypophysical), is not
only an indispensable substratum of all sound theoretical knowledge of
duties, but is at the same time a desideratum of the highest
importance to the actual fulfilment of their precepts. For the pure
conception of duty, unmixed with any foreign addition of empirical
attractions, and, in a word, the conception of the moral law,
exercises on the human heart, by way of reason alone (which first
becomes aware with this that it can of itself be practical), an
influence so much more powerful than all other springs * which may be
derived from the field of experience, that, in the consciousness of
its worth, it despises the latter, and can by degrees become their
master; whereas a mixed ethics, compounded partly of motives drawn
from feelings and inclinations, and partly also of conceptions of
reason, must make the mind waver between motives which cannot be
brought under any principle, which lead to good only by mere
accident and very often also to evil.
* I have a letter from the late excellent Sulzer, in which he asks
me what can be the reason that moral instruction, although containing
much that is convincing for the reason, yet accomplishes so little? My
answer was postponed in order that I might make it complete. But it is
simply this: that the teachers themselves have not got their own
notions clear, and when they endeavour to make up for this by raking
up motives of moral goodness from every quarter, trying to make
their physic right strong, they spoil it. For the commonest
understanding shows that if we imagine, on the one hand, an act of
honesty done with steadfast mind, apart from every view to advantage
of any kind in this world or another, and even under the greatest
temptations of necessity or allurement, and, on the other hand, a
similar act which was affected, in however low a degree, by a
foreign motive, the former leaves far behind and eclipses the
second; it elevates the soul and inspires the wish to be able to act
in like manner oneself. Even moderately young children feel this
impression, ana one should never represent duties to them in any other
light.
From what has been said, it is clear that all moral conceptions have
their seat and origin completely a priori in the reason, and that,
moreover, in the commonest reason just as truly as in that which is in
the highest degree speculative; that they cannot be obtained by
abstraction from any empirical, and therefore merely contingent,
knowledge; that it is just this purity of their origin that makes them
worthy to serve as our supreme practical principle, and that just in
proportion as we add anything empirical, we detract from their genuine
influence and from the absolute value of actions; that it is not
only of the greatest necessity, in a purely speculative point of view,
but is also of the greatest practical importance, to derive these
notions and laws from pure reason, to present them pure and unmixed,
and even to determine the compass of this practical or pure rational
knowledge, i.e., to determine the whole faculty of pure practical
reason; and, in doing so, we must not make its principles dependent on
the particular nature of human reason, though in speculative
philosophy this may be permitted, or may even at times be necessary;
but since moral laws ought to hold good for every rational creature,
we must derive them from the general concept of a rational being. In
this way, although for its application to man morality has need of
anthropology, yet, in the first instance, we must treat it
independently as pure philosophy, i.e., as metaphysic, complete in
itself (a thing which in such distinct branches of science is easily
done); knowing well that unless we are in possession of this, it would
not only be vain to determine the moral element of duty in right
actions for purposes of speculative criticism, but it would be
impossible to base morals on their genuine principles, even for common
practical purposes, especially of moral instruction, so as to
produce pure moral dispositions, and to engraft them on men's minds to
the promotion of the greatest possible good in the world.
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