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Page 34
The reader may have to learn, and not, perhaps, without some surprise,
that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Chatillon
Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal
powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and to
territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the
report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of
arguments.
After the ill-timed and useless union of the Hanse Towns to France I
returned to Hamburg in the spring of 1811 to convey my family to France.
I then had some conversation with Davoust. On one occasion I said to him
that if his hopes were realised, and my sad predictions respecting the
war with Russia overthrown, I hoped to see the restoration of the Kingdom
of Poland. Davoust replied that that event was probable, since he had
Napoleon's promise of the Viceroyalty of that Kingdom, and as several of
his comrades had been promised starosties. Davoust made no secret of
this, and it was generally known throughout Hamburg and the north of
Germany.
But notwithstanding what Davoust said respecting. Napoleon's intentions
I considered that these promises had been conditional rather than
positive.
On Napoleon's arrival in Poland the Diet of Warsaw, assured, as there
seemed reason to be, of the Emperor's sentiments, declared the Kingdom
free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were
pronounced to be null; and certainly the Diet had a right so to act, for
it calculated upon his support. But the address of the Diet to Napoleon,
in which these principles were declared, was ill received. His answer
was full of doubt and indecision, the motive of which could not be
blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia he had just
guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon
therefore declared that he could take no part in any movement or
resolution which might disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish
provinces forming a part of her Empire. To act otherwise, he said, would
be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw her
into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian
provinces, Napoleon declared he would see what he could do, should
Providence favour the good cause. These vague and obscure expressions
did not define what he intended to do for the Poles in the event of
success crowning his vast enterprises. They excited the distrust of the
Poles, and had no other result. On this subject, however, an observation
occurs which is of some force as an apology for Napoleon. Poland was
successively divided between three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia,
with each of which Napoleon had been at war, but never with all three at
once. He had therefore never been able to take advantage of his
victories to re-establish Poland without injuring the interests of
neutral powers or of his allies. Hence it may be concluded not only that
he never had the positive will which would have triumphed over all
obstacles, but also that there never was a possibility of realising those
dreams and projects of revenge in which he had indulged on the banks of
the Nile, as it were to console the departed spirit of Sulkowski.
Bonaparte's character presents many unaccountable incongruities.
Although the most positive man that perhaps ever existed, yet there never
was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In many
circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same
thing. He never indulged in greater illusions than at the beginning of
the campaign of Moscow. Even before the approach of the disasters which
accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, all sensible
persons concurred in the opinion that the Emperor ought to have passed
the winter of 1812-13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises in
the spring. But his natural impatience impelled him forward as it were
unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an invisible
demon stronger than even his own strong will. This demon was ambition.
He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently understood its
power, and how much is sometimes gained by delay. Yet Caesar's
Commentaries, which were his favourite study, ought to have shown him
that Caesar did not conquer Gaul in one campaign. Another illusion by
which Napoleon was misled during the campaign of Moscow, and perhaps past
experience rendered it very excusable, was the belief that the Emperor
Alexander would propose peace when he saw him at the head of his army on
the Russian territory. The prolonged stay of Bonaparte at Moscow can
indeed be accounted for in no other way than by supposing that he
expected the Russian Cabinet would change its opinion and consent to
treat for peace. However, whatever might have been the reason, after his
long and useless stay in Moscow Napoleon left that city with the design
of taking up his winter quarters in Poland; but Fate now frowned upon
Napoleon, and in that dreadful retreat the elements seemed leagued with
the Russians to destroy the most formidable army ever commanded by one
chief. To find a catastrophe in history comparable to that of the
Beresina we must go back to the destruction of the legions of Varus.
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