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Page 65
But it is said there is and indeed can be no war between the Government
and any of the States; but only between the former, and certain
rebellious individuals in the States. We are well aware that in the
ordinary operation of the Federal Government, it acts directly on
individuals and not on States. The cause of this arrangement and its
purpose are well understood. But in case of war or insurrection, the
power must be coextensive with the emergency which calls it forth. If
States are actually in rebellion, then of necessity the Government must
treat that fact according to its real nature. The fiction of supposing
the State to be loyal when its citizens are all traitors, and of
considering it incapable of insurrection when all its authorities are
notoriously in open rebellion, would be not less pernicious in its folly
and imbecility than it would be absurd to the common sense of mankind.
Undoubtedly it may be true in some instances, that the rebellion has
usurped authority in the States. The will of the people may have been
utterly disregarded, and set aside by violence or fraud. The
insurrectionary government of the State may be only the government _de
facto_ and not _de jure_, using these terms with reference only to the
State and its people, and not with reference to the paramount authority
of the Union which, under all circumstances, deprives the
insurrectionary State organization of any legal character whatever. In
all cases of such usurped authority, the people of the States would have
the unquestionable right to be restored to the Union upon the terms of
their recent connection, without any conditions whatever. It would be
the solemn duty of the United States to defend each one of its members
from the violence which might thus have overthrown its legitimate
government. But, on the other hand, when the people of the States
themselves have inaugurated the insurrectionary movement and have
voluntarily sustained it in its war upon the Government, then no such
favor can reasonably be claimed for them. If excitement and delusion
have suddenly hurried them into rebellion against their better judgments
and their real inclinations, they are to be pitied for their misfortune,
and ought to be treated with great leniency and favor; but they cannot
claim exemption from those conditions which may be imperatively demanded
for the future security and tranquillity of the country.
If by possibility there might be some technical legal difficulty in this
view, there would be none whatever of a practical nature; for any mind
gifted with the most ordinary endowment of reason would not fail to be
impressed with the gross inconsistency and inequality of holding that
rebels may not only set aside the Constitution at their will and make
war for its destruction, but may set it up again and claim its
protection; while its defenders and faithful asserters must be held to
such strict and impracticable regard for its provisions that they may
not take the precautions necessary to preserve it, even in the emergency
of putting down a rebellion against it. Such an irrational predicament
of constitutional difficulties and political contradictions would soon
necessitate its own solution. The revolution on the one side would
induce a similar revolutionary movement on the other; attempted
destruction by violence would justify the measures necessary to the
restoration of the Government and to its permanent security in the
future. There would be little hesitation in adopting these measures in
spite of any doubt as to their regularity. The public safety would be
acknowledged as the supreme law, and they who had placed themselves in
the attitude of public enemies could not complain of the rigid
application of its requirements to them.
The most inveterate of the rebels certainly do not anticipate the
relaxation of this principle. They are careful to make known to the
Southern people the impossibility of returning to the Union, except upon
such conditions as may be prescribed by the conquering power. It is true
they do this to deter their followers from indulging the thought of any
restoration of their former Federal relations; but this fact of itself
shows their consciousness of the justice of the position. They have
betrayed their people into a situation from which they cannot reasonably
hope to escape without making important concessions to the Federal
Government. Their effort now is to convince the misguided population of
the South that the required concessions will be more intolerable than
the indefinite continuance of a hopeless and destructive civil war.
There is no necessity, however, to go beyond the limits of the
Constitution; nor is there any reason to believe that the Government, in
any event, will be disposed to exact terms inconsistent with the true
spirit of our institutions. A great danger, such as now threatens our
country, might, in some circumstances, justify a revolution, altering
even the fundamental laws, for the purpose of preserving our national
unity. The justification would depend upon the nature of the
circumstances--the extremity and urgency of the peril; and the change
would be recognized and defended as the result of violence, irregular
and revolutionary. At a more tranquil period, in the absence of danger
and excitement, it would be practicable to return to the former
principles of political action; or, in case of necessity, the sanction
of the people might be obtained in the forms prescribed by the
Constitution, and the change found necessary in the revolutionary period
would either be approved and retained, modified, or altogether rejected.
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