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Page 9
In July, 1914, the Italian Government was not taken by surprise. They
had observed the increase year by year of the German army and of the
German fleet. At the end of the Balkan wars they had been asked whether
they would agree to an Austrian attack upon Serbia. They had
consequently long been deliberating as to what their course should be in
case of war, and they had made up their minds that under no
circumstances would they aid Germany against England.
Quite independently of her long-standing friendship with England it
would be suicide to Italy in her geographical position to enter a war
which should permit her coast to be attacked by the English and French
navies, and her participation in the Triple Alliance always carried the
proviso that it did not bind her to fight England. This was well known
in the German foreign office, and, indeed, in France where the writers
upon war were reckoning confidently on the withdrawing of Italy from the
Triple Alliance, and planning to use the entire forces of France against
Germany.
A better understanding of the Italian position will result from a
consideration of the origin of the Triple Alliance.
After the war of 1870, Bismarck, perceiving the quick recovery of
France, considered the advisability of attacking her again, and, to use
his own words, "bleeding her white." He found, however, that if this
were attempted France would be joined by Russia and England and he gave
up this plan. In order, however, to render France powerless he planned
an alliance which should be able to control Europe. A league between
Germany, Austria and Russia was his desire, and for some time every
opportunity was taken to develop friendship with the Czar. Russia,
however, remained cool. Her Pan-Slavonic sympathies were opposed to the
interests of Germany. Bismarck, therefore, determined, without losing
the friendship of Russia, to persuade Italy to join in the continental
combination. Italy, at the time, was the least formidable of the six
great powers, but Bismarck foresaw that she could be made good use of
in such a combination.
At that time Italy, just after the completion of Italian unity, found
herself in great perplexity. Her treatment of the Pope had brought about
the hostility of Roman Catholics throughout the world. She feared both
France and Austria, who were strong Catholic countries, and hardly knew
where to look for friends. The great Italian leader at the time was
Francesco Crispi, who, beginning as a Radical and a conspirator, had
become a constitutional statesman. Bismarck professed the greatest
friendship for Crispi, and gave Crispi to understand that he approved of
Italy's aspirations on the Adriatic and in Tunis.
The next year, however, at the Berlin Congress, Italy's interests were
ignored, and finally, in 1882, France seized Tunis, to the great
indignation of the Italians. It has been shown in more recent times that
the French seizure of Tunis was directly due to Bismarck's instigation.
The Italians having been roused to wrath, Bismarck proceeded to offer
them a place in the councils of the Triple Alliance. It was an easy
argument that such an alliance would protect them against France, and no
doubt it was promised that it would free them from the danger of attack
by Austria. England, at the time, was isolated, and Italy continued on
the best understanding with her.
The immediate result of the alliance was a growth of Italian hostility
toward France, which led, in 1889, to a tariff war on France. Meanwhile
German commercial and financial enterprises were pushed throughout the
Italian peninsula. What did Italy gain by this? Her commerce was
weakened, and Austria permitted herself every possible unfriendly act
except open war.
As time went on Germany and Austria became more and more arrogant.
Italy's ambitions on the Balkan peninsula were absolutely ignored. In
1908 Austria appropriated Bosnia and Herzegovina, another blow to Italy.
By this time Italy understood the situation well, and that same year,
seeing no future for herself in Europe, she swooped down on Tripoli. In
doing this she forestalled Germany herself, for Germany had determined
to seize Tripoli.
[Illustration: HOW THE POWERS DIVIDED NORTHERN AFRICA]
Both Germany and Austria were opposed to this action of Italy, but
Italy's eyes were now open. Thirty years of political alliance had
created no sympathy among the Italians for the Germans. Moreover, it was
not entirely a question of policy. The lordly arrogance of the
Prussians caused sharp antagonism. The Italians were lovers of liberty;
the Germans pledged toward autocracy. They found greater sympathy in
England and in France.
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