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Page 47
[Illustration: IMMORTAL VERDUN, WHERE THE FRENCH HELD THE GERMANS WITH
THE INSPIRING SLOGAN, "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"]
Why did Germany select this particular point for its grand offensive?
The answer is to be found in a demand made by the great Junker
associations of Germany in May, 1915, nine months before the attack was
undertaken. That demand was to the effect that Verdun should be attacked
and captured. They declared that the Verdun fortifications made a
menacing salient thrust into the rich iron fields of the Briey basin.
From this metalliferous field of Lorraine came the ore that supplied
eighty per cent of the steel required for German and Austrian guns and
munitions. These fields of Briey were only twenty miles from the great
guns of Verdun. They were French territory at the beginning of the war
and had been seized by the army of the Crown Prince, co-operating with
the Army of Metz because of their immense value to the Germans in war
making.
As a preliminary to the battle, von Falkenhayn placed a semicircle of
huge howitzers and rifles around the field of Briey. Then assembling the
vast forces drained from all the fronts and having erected ammunition
dumps covering many acres, the great battle commenced with a surprise
attack upon the village of Haumont on February 21, 1916.
The first victory of the Germans at that point was an easy one. The
great fort of Douaumont was the next objective. This was taken on
February 25th after a concentrated bombardment that for intensity
surpassed anything that heretofore had been shown in the war.
Von Falkenhayn, personally superintending the disposition of guns and
men, had now penetrated the outer defenses of Verdun. The tide was
running against the French, and shells, more shells for the guns of all
caliber; men, more men for the earthworks surrounding the devoted city
were needed. The narrow-gauge railway connecting Verdun with the great
French depots of supplies was totally inadequate for the transportation
burdens suddenly cast upon it. In this desperate emergency a transport
system was born of necessity, a system that saved Verdun. It was fleet
upon fleet of motor trucks, all sizes, all styles; anything that could
pack a few shells or a handful of men was utilized. The backbone of the
system was a great fleet of trucks driven by men whose average daily
rest was four hours, and upon whose horizon-blue uniforms the stains of
snow and sleet, of dust and mud, were indelibly fixed through the
winter, spring, summer and fall of 1916, for the glorious engagement
continued from February 21st until November 2d, when the Germans were
forced into full retreat from the field of honor, the evacuation of Fort
Vaux putting a period to Germany's disastrous plan and to von
Falkenhayn's military career.
Lord Northcliffe, describing the early days of the immortal battle,
wrote:
"Verdun is, in many ways, the most extraordinary of battles. The mass of
metal used on both sides is far beyond all parallel; the transformation
on the Douaumont Ridge was more suddenly dramatic than even the battle
of the Marne; and, above all, the duration of the conflict already looks
as if it would surpass anything in history. More than a month has
elapsed since, by the kindness of General Joffre and General P�tain, I
was able to watch the struggle from various vital viewpoints. The battle
had then been raging with great intensity for a fortnignt, and, as I
write, four to five thousand guns are still thundering round Verdun.
Impossible, therefore, any man to describe the entire battle. The most
one can do is to set down one's impressions of the first phases of a
terrible conflict, the end of which cannot be foreseen.
"My chief impression is one of admiration for the subtle powers of mind
of the French High Command. General Joffre and General Castelnau are men
with especially fine intellects tempered to terrible keenness. Always
they have had to contend against superior numbers. In 1870, when they
were subalterns, their country lost the advantage of its numerous
population by abandoning general military service at a time when Prussia
was completely realizing the idea of a nation in arms. In 1914, when
they were commanders, France was inferior to a still greater degree in
point of numbers to Prussianized Germany. In armament, France was
inferior at first to her enemy. The French High Command has thus been
trained by adversity to do all that human intellect can against almost
overwhelming hostile material forces. General Joffre, General
Castelnau--and, later, General P�tain, who at a moment's notice
displaced General Herr--had to display genius where the Germans were
exhibiting talent, and the result is to be seen at Verdun. They there
caught the enemy in a series of traps of a kind hitherto unknown in
modern warfare--something elemental, and yet subtle, neo-primitive,
and befitting the atavistic character of the Teuton. They caught him in
a web of his own unfulfilled boasts.
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