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Page 12
Meantime war raged on a great scale between Russia
and the Sultan; and, until the time arrived for throwing
off their vassalage, it was necessary that Oubacha should 30
contribute his usual contingent of martial aid. Nay, it
had unfortunately become prudent that he should contribute
much more than his usual aid. Human experience
gives ample evidence that in some mysterious and
unaccountable way no great design is ever agitated, no
matter how few or how faithful may be the participators,
but that some presentiment--some dim misgiving--is
kindled amongst those whom it is chiefly important to
blind. And, however it might have happened, certain it 5
is that already, when as yet no syllable of the conspiracy
had been breathed to any man whose very existence was
not staked upon its concealment, nevertheless some vague
and uneasy jealousy had arisen in the Russian Cabinet
as to the future schemes of the Kalmuck Khan: and 10
very probable it is that, but for the war then raging, and
the consequent prudence of conciliating a very important
vassal, or, at least, of abstaining from what would powerfully
alienate him, even at that moment such measures
would have been adopted as must forever have intercepted 15
the Kalmuck schemes. Slight as were the jealousies
of the Imperial Court, they had not escaped the
Machiavelian eyes of Zebek and the Lama. And under
their guidance, Oubacha, bending to the circumstances of
the moment, and meeting the jealousy of the Russian 20
Court with a policy corresponding to their own, strove by
unusual zeal to efface the Czarina's unfavorable impressions.
He enlarged the scale of his contributions, and
_that_ so prodigiously that he absolutely carried to headquarters
a force of 35,000 cavalry, fully equipped: some 25
go further, and rate the amount beyond 40,000; but the
smaller estimate is, at all events, _within_ the truth.
With this magnificent array of cavalry, heavy as well as
light, the Khan went into the field under great expectations;
and these he more than realized. Having the 30
good fortune to be concerned with so ill-organized and
disorderly a description of force as that which at all times
composed the bulk of a Turkish army, he carried victory
along with his banners; gained many partial successes;
and at last, in a pitched battle, overthrew the Turkish
force opposed to him, with a loss of 5000 men left upon
the field.
These splendid achievements seemed likely to operate
in various ways against the impending revolt. Oubacha 5
had now a strong motive, in the martial glory acquired,
for continuing his connection with the empire in whose
service he had won it, and by whom only it could be fully
appreciated. He was now a great marshal of a great
empire, one of the Paladins around the imperial throne; 10
in China he would be nobody, or (worse than that) a mendicant
alien, prostrate at the feet, and soliciting the precarious
alms, of a prince with whom he had no connection.
Besides, it might reasonably be expected that the Czarina,
grateful for the really efficient aid given by the Tartar 15
prince, would confer upon him such eminent rewards as
might be sufficient to anchor his hopes upon Russia, and
to wean him from every possible seduction. These were
the obvious suggestions of prudence and good sense to
every man who stood neutral in the case. But they were 20
disappointed. The Czarina knew her obligations to the
Khan, but she did not acknowledge them. Wherefore?
That is a mystery perhaps never to be explained. So it
was, however. The Khan went unhonored; no _ukase_
ever proclaimed his merits; and, perhaps, had he even 25
been abundantly recompensed by Russia, there were
others who would have defeated these tendencies to
reconciliation. Erempel, Zebek, and Loosang the Lama
were pledged life-deep to prevent any accommodation;
and their efforts were unfortunately seconded by those of 30
their deadliest enemies. In the Russian Court there were
at that time some great nobles preoccupied with feelings
of hatred and blind malice toward the Kalmucks quite as
strong as any which the Kalmucks could harbor toward
Russia, and not, perhaps, so well founded. Just as much
as the Kalmucks hated the Russian yoke, their galling
assumption of authority, the marked air of disdain, as
toward a nation of ugly, stupid, and filthy barbarians,
which too generally marked the Russian bearing and 5
language, but, above all, the insolent contempt, or even
outrages, which the Russian governors or great military
commandants tolerated in their followers toward the barbarous
religion and superstitious mummeries of the Kalmuck
priesthood--precisely in that extent did the ferocity 10
of the Russian resentment, and their wrath at seeing the
trampled worm turn or attempt a feeble retaliation, react
upon the unfortunate Kalmucks. At this crisis, it is probable
that envy and wounded pride, upon witnessing the
splendid victories of Oubacha and Momotbacha over the 15
Turks and Bashkirs, contributed strength to the Russian
irritation. And it must have been through the intrigues
of those nobles about her person who chiefly smarted
under these feelings that the Czarina could ever have
lent herself to the unwise and ungrateful policy pursued 20
at this critical period toward the Kalmuck Khan. That
Czarina was no longer Elizabeth Petrowna; it was Catharine II.--a
princess who did not often err so injuriously
(injuriously for herself as much as for others) in the measures
of her government. She had soon ample reason for 25
repenting of her false policy. Meantime, how much it
must have co-operated with the other motives previously
acting upon Oubacha in sustaining his determination to
revolt, and how powerfully it must have assisted the efforts
of all the Tartar chieftains in preparing the minds of their 30
people to feel the necessity of this difficult enterprise, by
arming their pride and their suspicions against the Russian
Government, through the keenness of their sympathy
with the wrongs of their insulted prince, may be readily
imagined. It is a fact, and it has been confessed by
candid Russians themselves when treating of this great
dismemberment, that the conduct of the Russian Cabinet
throughout the period of suspense, and during the crisis
of hesitation in the Kalmuck Council, was exactly such 5
as was most desirable for the purposes of the conspirators;
it was such, in fact, as to set the seal to all their
machinations, by supplying distinct evidences and official
vouchers for what could otherwise have been at the most
matters of doubtful suspicion and indirect presumption. 10
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