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Page 6
JAMES G. BLAINE.
Mr. Blaine's diplomatic career began with his appointment as secretary
of state on March 5, 1881, and ended with his resignation on December
19, three months after President Garfield's death. The two principal
objects of his foreign policy, as defined by himself on September 1,
1882, were these: "First, to bring about peace, and prevent future wars
in North and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly
commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a
large increase in the export trade of the United States, by supplying
those fabrics in which we are abundantly able to compete with the
manufacturing nations of Europe." President Garfield, in his inaugural
address, had repeated the declaration of his predecessor that it was
"the right and duty of the United States to assert and maintain such
supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
that connects North and South America as will protect our national
interests." This policy, which had received the direct approval of
Congress, was vigorously upheld by Secretary Blaine. The Colombian
Republic had proposed to the European powers to join in a guaranty of
the neutrality of the proposed Panama Canal. One of President Garfield's
first acts under the advice of Secretary Blaine was to remind the
European governments of the exclusive rights which the United States had
secured with the country to be traversed by the interoceanic waterway.
These exclusive rights rendered the prior guaranty of the United States
government indispensable, and the powers were informed that any foreign
guaranty would be not only an unnecessary but unfriendly act. As the
United States had made, in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, a special
agreement with Great Britain on this subject, Secretary Blaine
supplemented his memorandum to the powers by a formal proposal for the
abrogation of all provisions of that convention which were not in accord
with the guaranties and privileges covenanted for in the compact with
the Colombian Republic. In this state paper, the most elaborate of the
series receiving his signature as secretary of state, Mr. Blaine
contended that the operation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty practically
conceded to Great Britain the control of any canal which might be
constructed in the isthmus, as that power was required, by its insular
position and colonial possessions, to maintain a naval establishment
with which the United States could not compete. As the American
government had bound itself by its engagements in the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty not to fight in the isthmus, nor to fortify the mouths of any
waterway that might be constructed, the secretary argued that if any
struggle for the control of the canal were to arise England would have
an advantage at the outset which would prove decisive. "The treaty," he
remarked, "commands this government not to use a single regiment of
troops to protect its interests in connection with the interoceanic
canal, but to surrender the transit to the guardianship and control of
the British navy." The logic of this paper was unanswerable from an
American point of view.
The war between Chili and Peru had virtually ended with the capture of
Lima on January 17, 1881. The state department made strenuous exertions
to bring about the conclusion of an early peace between Chili and the
two prostrate states which had been crushed in war. The influence of the
government was brought to bear upon victorious Chili in the interest of
peace and magnanimity; but, owing to an unfortunate misapprehension of
Mr. Blaine's instructions, the United States ministers did not promote
the ends of peace. Special envoys were accordingly sent to South
America, accredited to the three governments, with general instructions
which should enable them to bring those belligerent powers into friendly
relations. After they had set out from New York Mr. Blaine resigned, and
Mr. Frelinghuysen reversed the diplomatic policy with such precipitate
haste that the envoys on arriving at their destination were informed by
the Chilian minister of foreign affairs that their instructions had been
countermanded, and that their mission was an idle farce. By this
reversal of diplomatic methods and purposes the influence of the United
States government on the South American coast was reduced to so low a
point as to become insignificant. Mr. Blaine's policy had been at once
strong and pacific. It was followed by a period of no policy, which
enabled Chili to make a conqueror's terms with the conquered and to
seize as much territory as pleased her rapacious generals.
The most conspicuous act of Mr. Blaine's administration of the state
department was his invitation to the peace congress. The proposition was
to invite all the independent governments of North and South America to
meet in a peace congress at Washington on March 15, 1882. The
representatives of all the minor governments on this continent were to
agree, if possible, upon some comprehensive plan for averting war by
means of arbitration, and for resisting the intrigues of European
diplomacy. Invitations were sent on November 22, with the limitations
and restrictions originally designed. Mr. Frelinghuysen lost no time in
undermining this diplomatic congress, and the meeting never took place.
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