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Page 21
[A] "All events come alike to all: there is one event to the
righteous and to the wicked: to the good and to the clean and
to the unclean," &c. (Ecclesiastes, ix. v. 2); and (v. 3),
"This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun,
that there is one event unto all." In what sense "evil" is
meant here seems rather doubtful. There is no doubt about the
emperor's meaning. Compare Epictetus, Enchiridion, c. i., &c.;
and the doctrine of the Brachmans (Strabo p. 713, ed. Cas.):
[Greek: agathon de � kakon m�den einai t�n sumbainont�n
anthr�pois].
[B] Seneca (Ep. 102) has the same, whether an expression of his
own opinion, or merely a fine saying of others employed to
embellish his writings, I know not. After speaking of the child
being prepared in the womb to live this life, he adds, "Sic per
hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium
naturae sumimur partum. Alia origo nos expectat, alius rerum
status." See Ecclesiastes, xii. 7; and Lucan, i. 457:--
"Longae, canitis si cognita, vitae
Mors media est."
Antoninus' opinion of a future life is nowhere clearly expressed. His
doctrine of the nature of the soul of necessity implies that it does not
perish absolutely, for a portion of the divinity cannot perish. The
opinion is at least as old as the time of Epicharmus and Euripides; what
comes from earth goes back to earth, and what comes from heaven, the
divinity, returns to him who gave it. But I find nothing clear in
Antoninus as to the notion of the man existing after death so as to be
conscious of his sameness with that soul which occupied his vessel of
clay. He seems to be perplexed on this matter, and finally to have
rested in this, that God or the gods will do whatever is best, and
consistent with the university of things.
Nor, I think, does he speak conclusively on another Stoic doctrine,
which some Stoics practised,--the anticipating the regular course of
nature by a man's own act. The reader will find some passages in which
this is touched on, and he may make of them what he can. But there are
passages in which the emperor encourages himself to wait for the end
patiently and with tranquillity; and certainly it is consistent with all
his best teaching that a man should bear all that falls to his lot and
do useful acts as he lives. He should not therefore abridge the time of
his usefulness by his own act. Whether he contemplates any possible
cases in which a man should die by his own hand, I cannot tell; and the
matter is not worth a curious inquiry, for I believe it would not lead
to any certain result as to his opinion on this point. I do not think
that Antoninus, who never mentions Seneca, though he must have known all
about him, would have agreed with Seneca when he gives as a reason for
suicide, that the eternal law, whatever he means, has made nothing
better for us than this, that it has given us only one way of entering
into life and many ways of going out of it. The ways of going out indeed
are many, and that is a good reason for a man taking care of himself.[A]
[A] See Plinius H.N. ii., c. 7; Seneca, De Provid. c. 6; and
Ep. 70: "Nihil melius aeterna lex," &c.
Happiness was not the direct object of a Stoic's life. There is no rule
of life contained in the precept that a man should pursue his own
happiness. Many men think that they are seeking happiness when they are
only seeking the gratification of some particular passion, the strongest
that they have. The end of a man is, as already explained, to live
conformably to nature, and he will thus obtain happiness, tranquillity
of mind, and contentment (iii. 12; viii. 1, and other places). As a
means of living conformably to nature he must study the four chief
virtues, each of which has its proper sphere: wisdom, or the knowledge
of good and evil; justice, or the giving to every man his due;
fortitude, or the enduring of labor and pain; and temperance, which is
moderation in all things. By thus living conformably to nature the Stoic
obtained all that he wished or expected. His reward was in his virtuous
life, and he was satisfied with that. Some Greek poet long ago wrote:--
"For virtue only of all human things
Takes her reward not from the hands of others.
Virtue herself rewards the toils of virtue."
Some of the Stoics indeed expressed themselves in very arrogant, absurd
terms, about the wise man's self-sufficiency; they elevated him to the
rank of a deity.[A] But these were only talkers and lecturers, such as
those in all ages who utter fine words, know little of human affairs,
and care only for notoriety. Epictetus and Antoninus both by precept and
example labored to improve themselves and others; and if we discover
imperfections in their teaching, we must still honor these great men who
attempted to show that there is in man's nature and in the constitution
of things sufficient reason for living a virtuous life. It is difficult
enough to live as we ought to live, difficult even for any man to live
in such a way as to satisfy himself, if he exercises only in a moderate
degree the power of reflecting upon and reviewing his own conduct; and
if all men cannot be brought to the same opinions in morals and
religion, it is at least worth while to give them good reasons for as
much as they can be persuaded to accept.
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