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Page 6
In conclusion, while Great Britain is undoubtedly the most formidable
of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and by the strong
positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial
understanding with that country is one of the first of our external
interests. Both nations doubtless, and properly, seek their own
advantage; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and
justice, drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their
instincts. Whatever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual
standards of right will certainly follow. Formal alliance between the
two is out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity
of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will
facilitate a co-operation beneficial to both; for if sentimentality is
weak, sentiment is strong.
[Illustration: THE PACIFIC OCEAN]
HAWAII AND OUR FUTURE SEA POWER.
[The origin of the ensuing article was as follows: At the time of
the Revolution in Hawaii, at the beginning of 1893, the author
addressed to the "New York Times" a letter, which appeared in the
issue of January 31. This, falling under the eye of the Editor of
the "Forum," suggested to him to ask an article upon the general
military--or naval--value of the Hawaiian group. The letter
alluded to ran thus:--
_To the Editor of the "New York Times"_:--
There is one aspect of the recent revolution in Hawaii which seems
to have been kept out of sight, and that is the relation of the
islands, not merely to our own and to European countries, but to
China. How vitally important that may become in the future is
evident from the great number of Chinese, relatively to the whole
population, now settled in the islands.
It is a question for the whole civilized world and not for the
United States only, whether the Sandwich Islands, with their
geographical and military importance, unrivalled by that of any
other position in the North Pacific, shall in the future be an
outpost of European civilization, or of the comparative barbarism
of China. It is sufficiently known, but not, perhaps, generally
noted in our country, that many military men abroad, familiar with
Eastern conditions and character, look with apprehension toward
the day when the vast mass of China--now inert--may yield to one
of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization
under a wave of barbaric invasion. The great armies of Europe,
whose existence is so frequently deplored, may be providentially
intended as a barrier to that great movement, if it come.
Certainly, while China remains as she is, nothing more disastrous
for the future of the world can be imagined than that general
disarmament of Europe which is the Utopian dream of some
philanthropists.
China, however, may burst her barriers eastward as well as
westward, toward the Pacific as well as toward the European
Continent. In such a movement it would be impossible to exaggerate
the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the Sandwich
Islands by a great, civilized, maritime power. By its nearness to
the scene, and by the determined animosity to the Chinese movement
which close contact seems to inspire, our own country, with its
Pacific coast, is naturally indicated as the proper guardian for
this most important position. To hold it, however, whether in the
supposed case or in war with a European state, implies a great
extension of our naval power. Are we ready to undertake this?
A.T. MAHAN, _Captain, United States Navy_.
NEW YORK, Jan. 30, 1893.]
The suddenness--so far, at least, as the general public is
concerned--with which the long-existing troubles in Hawaii have come to
a head, and the character of the advances reported to be addressed to
the United States by the revolutionary government, formally recognized
as _de facto_ by our representative on the spot, add another to the
many significant instances furnished by history, that, as men in the
midst of life are in death, so nations in the midst of peace find
themselves confronted with unexpected causes of dissension, conflicts
of interests, whose results may be, on the one hand, war, or, on the
other, abandonment of clear and imperative national advantage in order
to avoid an issue for which preparation has not been made. By no
premeditated contrivance of our own, by the cooperation of a series of
events which, however dependent step by step upon human action, were
not intended to prepare the present crisis, the United States finds
herself compelled to answer a question--to make a decision--not unlike
and not less momentous than that required of the Roman senate, when the
Mamertine garrison invited it to occupy Messina, and so to abandon the
hitherto traditional policy which had confined the expansion of Rome to
the Italian peninsula. For let it not be overlooked that, whether we
wish or no, we _must_ answer the question, we _must_ make the decision.
The issue cannot be dodged. Absolute inaction in such a case is a
decision as truly as the most vehement action. We can now advance, but,
the conditions of the world being what they are, if we do not advance
we recede; for there is involved not so much a particular action as a
question of principle, pregnant of great consequences in one direction
or in the other.
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