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Page 30
Breckenridge had 11,000 men, Bragg and Hardee about 20,000, Hindman
and Polk not far from 10,000. The whole Confederate force was
afterward stated in their official reports to be 39,000 men; it
probably reached 45,000, but certainly not more. This statement will
create surprise, and perhaps denial, but I know whereof I affirm in
this. At that time I did not know it, nor did the troops generally
have any clear idea of our force.
On Friday the 4th, orders reached us, at two P.M., to prepare five
days' rations, roll up our tents, leave them, and be prepared to
march in two hours, with forty rounds of ammunition. At the same
time an aid from General Breckenridge ordered me to go to his
head-quarters, with six reliable men. In a few minutes we answered
to the order, every man splendidly mounted, and ready for any
mission which he should designate.
With his quick eye he selected one for one duty and one for another,
until each had sped away; and turning to me, he said, "You will act
as a special _aid-de-camp_." This announcement I received with
especial gratification, as it would relieve me of all actual
fighting against the Old Flag, and give me an opportunity to see far
more of the progress of the battle which was to ensue than if I were
confined to the ranks. The special danger of the mission to which I
was called made no impression upon me. I can not recall any time
when I had a fear of falling, and I had none then. From that hour
until the close of the battle on Monday, I was near General
Breckenridge, or conveying dispatches to others from him; hence my
narrative of the scenes of the next three days will be mainly of
what occurred in General Breckenridge's division, and what I saw
while traversing the field of action, which I crossed and recrossed
twelve times.
On Friday, at eight P.M., we commenced to move toward Shiloh, in
silence, and with great circumspection, the army on different, but
converging roads. We made eight miles, and reached Monterey, a
little more than seven miles from Shiloh, at five o'clock on
Saturday morning. Here the different divisions formed a junction,
and marched forward prepared for action, though not immediately
expecting it. We proceeded with extreme caution until within three
and a half miles of Grant's pickets, and until our scouts had
determined their situation. We could get no nearer without bringing
on an engagement; and as General Beauregard had great confidence
that the reinforcements would arrive by morning, the afternoon of
Saturday was spent in making all necessary disposition of the forces
for an early and combined attack on Sunday morning.
While it is no part of my duty, in this narrative, to criticise
military movements, and especially those of the Union forces, I may
state that the total absence of cavalry pickets from General Grant's
army was a matter of perfect amazement to the Rebel officers. There
were absolutely none on Grant's left, where General Breckenridge's
division was meeting him, so that we were able to come up within
hearing of their drums entirely unperceived.
The Southern generals always kept cavalry pickets out for miles,
even when no enemy was supposed to be within a day's march of them.
The infantry pickets of Grant's forces were not above three-fourths
of a mile from his advance camps, and they were too few to make any
resistance. With these facts all made known to our head-quarters on
Saturday evening, our army was arranged for battle with the
certainty of a surprise, and almost the assurance of a victory.
Every regiment was carefully and doubly guarded, so that no man
might glide away from our ranks and put the Union forces on their
guard. This I noted particularly, as I was studying plans of escape
that night, that I might put the loyal forces on their guard
against the fearful avalanche ready to be hurled upon them. I
already saw that they would stand no fair chance for victory, taken
completely at unawares. But the orders were imperative to allow no
man to leave the ranks, and to shoot the first who should attempt it
on any pretence. Then of the nature of the ground between the
opposing forces I knew nothing, except that it was said to be
crossed and seamed by swamps, in many places almost impassable by
daylight, much more so at night. If, then, I should attempt to
desert, I must run the gauntlet of our own double guard, risk the
chance of making the three or four miles through woods and swamps in
deep darkness, and the more hazardous chance, on reaching the
Federal lines, of being shot by their pickets. I was therefore
compelled to relinquish the hope of escape that night--a sad
necessity, for if I had succeeded, it might have saved many Union
lives.
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