|
Main
- books.jibble.org
My Books
- IRC Hacks
Misc. Articles
- Meaning of Jibble
- M4 Su Doku
- Computer Scrapbooking
- Setting up Java
- Bootable Java
- Cookies in Java
- Dynamic Graphs
- Social Shakespeare
External Links
- Paul Mutton
- Jibble Photo Gallery
- Jibble Forums
- Google Landmarks
- Jibble Shop
- Free Books
- Intershot Ltd
|
books.jibble.org
Previous Page
| Next Page
Page 66
(1). _First of the power of Congress over this subject_.
The Constitution contains _powers_ granted to Congress, _compacts_
between the States, and _prohibitions_ addressed to the Nation and to
the States. A compact or prohibition may be accompanied by a power,--but
not necessarily, for it is essentially distinct in nature. And here the
single question arises, Whether the Constitution, by grant, general or
special, confers upon Congress any power to legislate on the subject of
fugitives from service.
* * * * *
The framers of the Constitution were wise and careful, having a reason
for what they did, and understanding the language they employed. They
did not, after discussion, incorporate into their work any superfluous
provision; nor did they without design adopt the peculiar arrangement
in which it appears. Adding to the record compact an express grant of
power, they testified not only their desire for such power in Congress,
but their conviction that without such express grant it would not
exist. But if express grant was necessary in this case, it was equally
necessary in all the other cases. _Expressum facit cessare tacitum_.
Especially, in view of its odious character, was it necessary in the
case of fugitives from service. Abstaining from any such grant, and then
grouping the bare compact with other similar compacts, separate from
every grant of power, they testified their purpose most significantly.
Not only do they decline all addition to the compact of any such power,
but, to render misapprehension impossible, to make assurance doubly
sure, to exclude any contrary conclusion, they punctiliously arrange the
clauses, on the principle of _noscitur a sociis_, so as to distinguish
all the grants of power, but especially to make the new grant of power,
in the case of public records, stand forth in the front by itself,
severed from the naked compacts with which it was originally associated.
Thus the proceedings of the Convention show that the founders understood
the necessity of powers in certain cases, and, on consideration,
jealously granted them. A closing example will strengthen the argument.
Congress is expressly empowered "to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,
throughout the United States." Without this provision these two subjects
would have fallen within the control of the States, leaving the nation
powerless to establish a uniform rule thereupon. Now, instead of the
existing compact on fugitives from service, it would have been easy,
had any such desire prevailed, to add this case to the clause on
naturalization and bankruptcies, and to empower Congress To ESTABLISH A
UNIFORM RULE FOR THE SURRENDER OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE THROUGHOUT THE
UNITED STATES. Then, of course, whenever Congress undertook to exercise
the power, all State control of the subject would be superseded. The
National Government would have been constistuted, like Nimrod, the
mighty Hunter, with power to gather the huntsmen, to halloo the pack,
and to direct the chase of men, ranging at will, without regard to
boundaries or jurisdictions, throughout all the States. But no person
in the Convention, not one of the reckless partisans of slavery, was so
audacious as to make this proposition. Had it been distinctly made, it
would have been as distinctly denied.
The fact that the provision on this subject was adopted unanimously,
while showing the little importance attached to it in the shape it
finally assumed, testifies also that it could not have been regarded as
a source of national power for Slavery. It will be remembered that among
the members of the Convention were Gouverneur Morris, who had said that
he "NEVER would concur in upholding domestic Slavery,"--Elbridge
Gerry, who thought we "ought to be careful NOT to give any sanction
to it,"--Roger Sherman, who "was OPPOSED to a tax on slaves imported,
because it implied they were property,"--James Madison, who "thought it
WRONG to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property
in men,"--and Benjamin Franklin, who likened American slaveholders to
Algerine corsairs. In the face of these unequivocal judgments, it is
absurd to suppose that these eminent citizens consented unanimously to
any provision by which the National Government, the creature of their
hands, dedicated to freedom, could become the most offensive agent of
Slavery.
Thus much for the evidence from the history of the Convention. But
the true principles of our political system are in harmony with this
conclusion of history; and here let me say a word of State rights.
It was the purpose of our fathers to create a National Government,
and to endow it with adequate powers. They had known the perils of
imbecility, discord, and confusion, protracted through the uncertain
days of the Confederation, and they desired a government which should
be a true bond of union and an efficient organ of national interests at
home and abroad. But while fashioning this agency, they fully recognized
the governments of the States. To the nation were delegated high powers,
essential to the national interests, but specific in character and
limited in number. To the States and to the people were reserved the
powers, general in character and unlimited in number, not delegated to
the nation or prohibited to the States.
Previous Page
| Next Page
|
|