|
Main
- books.jibble.org
My Books
- IRC Hacks
Misc. Articles
- Meaning of Jibble
- M4 Su Doku
- Computer Scrapbooking
- Setting up Java
- Bootable Java
- Cookies in Java
- Dynamic Graphs
- Social Shakespeare
External Links
- Paul Mutton
- Jibble Photo Gallery
- Jibble Forums
- Google Landmarks
- Jibble Shop
- Free Books
- Intershot Ltd
|
books.jibble.org
Previous Page
| Next Page
Page 18
It is idle to make the rightfulness of an act the measure of sovereign
power. The distinction between sovereign power and the moral right
to exercise it has always been recognized. All political power may be
abused, but is it to stop where abuse may begin? The power of declaring
war is a power of vast capacity for mischief, and capable of inflicting
the most wide-spread desolation. But it is given to Congress without
stint and without measure. Is a citizen, or are the courts of justice
to inquire whether that, or any other law, is just, before they obey or
execute it? And are there any degrees of injustice which will withdraw
from sovereign power the capacity of making a given law?
* * * * *
The power is "to admit new States into this Union," and it may be safely
conceded that here is discretion to admit or refuse. The question is,
what must we do if we do anything? What must we admit, and into what?
The answer is a State--and into this Union.
The distinction between Federal rights and local rights, is an idle
distinction. Because the new State acquires Federal rights, it is not,
therefore, in this Union. The Union is a compact; and is it an equal
party to that compact, because it has equal Federal rights?
How is the Union formed? By equal contributions of power. Make one
member sacrifice more than another, and it becomes unequal. The compact
is of two parts:
1. The thing obtained--Federal rights. 2. The price paid--local
sovereignty.
You may disturb the balance of the Union, either by diminishing the
thing acquired, or increasing the sacrifice paid.
What were the purposes of coming into the Union among the original
States? The States were originally sovereign without limit, as to
foreign and domestic concerns. But being incapable of protecting
themselves singly, they entered into the Union to defend themselves
against foreign violence. The domestic concerns of the people were not,
in general, to be acted on by it. The security of the power, of managing
them by domestic legislature, is one of the great objects of the Union.
The Union is a means, not an end. By requiring greater sacrifices
of domestic power, the end is sacrificed to the means. Suppose the
surrender of all, or nearly all, the domestic powers of legislation were
required; the means would there have swallowed up the end.
The argument that the compact may be enforced, shows that the Federal
predicament changed. The power of the Union not only acts on persons or
citizens, but on the faculty of the government, and restrains it in a
way which the Constitution nowhere authorizes. This new obligation takes
away a right which is expressly "reserved to the people or the States,"
since it is nowhere granted to the government of the Union. You cannot
do indirectly what you cannot do directly. It is said that this Union
is competent to make compacts. Who doubts it? But can you make this
compact? I insist that you cannot make it, because it is repugnant to
the thing to be done.
The effect of such a compact would be to produce that inequality in the
Union, to which the Constitution, in all its provisions, is adverse.
Everything in it looks to equality among the members of the Union. Under
it you cannot produce inequality. Nor can you get before-hand of the
Constitution, and do it by anticipation. Wait until a State is in the
Union, and you cannot do it; yet it is only upon the State in the Union
that what you do begins to act.
But it seems that, although the proposed restrictions may not be
justified by the clause of the Constitution which gives power to admit
new States into the Union, separately considered, there are other parts
of the Constitution which, combined with that clause, will warrant it.
And first, we are informed that there is a clause in this instrument
which declares that Congress shall guarantee to every State a republican
form of government; that slavery and such a form of government are
incompatible; and, finally, as a conclusion from these premises, that
Congress not only have a right, but are bound to exclude slavery from a
new State. Here again, sir, there is an edifying inconsistency between
the argument and the measure which it professes to vindicate. By the
argument it is maintained that Missouri cannot have a republican form of
government, and at the same time tolerate negro slavery. By the measure
it is admitted that Missouri may tolerate slavery, as to persons already
in bondage there, and be nevertheless fit to be received into the Union.
What sort of constitutional mandate is this which can thus be made
to bend and truckle and compromise as if it were a simple rule of
expediency that might admit of exceptions upon motives of countervailing
expediency. There can be no such pliancy in the peremptory provisions of
the Constitution. They cannot be obeyed by moieties and violated in the
same ratio. They must be followed out to their full extent, or treated
with that decent neglect which has at least the merit of forbearing to
render contumacy obtrusive by an ostentatious display of the very duty
which we in part abandon. If the decalogue could be observed in this
casuistical manner, we might be grievous sinners, and yet be liable to
no reproach. We might persist in all our habitual irregularities,
and still be spotless. We might, for example, continue to covet our
neighbors' goods, provided they were the same neighbors whose goods we
had before coveted--and so of all the other commandments.
Previous Page
| Next Page
|
|