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Page 11
The rule for apportionment of taxes is not necessarily the most
equitable rule for the apportionment of representatives among the
States; property must not be disregarded in the composition of the first
rule, but frequently is overlooked in the establishment of the second.
A rule which might be approved in respect to taxes, would be disapproved
in respect to representatives; one individual possessing twice as much
property as another, might be required to pay double the taxes of such
other; but no man has two votes to another's one; rich or poor, each has
but a single vote in the choice of representatives.
In the dispute between England and the colonies, the latter denied the
right of the former to tax them, because they were not represented in
the English Parliament. They contended that, according to the law of the
land, taxation and representation were inseparable. The rule of taxation
being agreed upon by the convention, it is possible that the maxim
with which we successfully opposed the claim of England may have had
an influence in procuring the adoption of the same rule for the
apportionment of representatives; the true meaning, however, of this
principle of the English constitution is, that a colony or district
is not to be taxed which is not represented; not that its number
of representatives shall be ascertained by its quota of taxes. If
three-fifths of the slaves are virtually represented, or their owners
obtain a disproportionate power in legislation, and in the appointment
of the President of the United States, why should not other property
be virtually represented, and its owners obtain a like power in
legislation, and in the choice of the President? Property is not
confined in slaves, but exists in houses, stores, ships, capital in
trade, and manufactures. To secure to the owners of property in slaves
greater political power than is allowed to the owners of other and
equivalent property, seems to be contrary to our theory of the equality
of personal rights, inasmuch as the citizens of some States thereby
become entitled to other and greater political power than the citizens
of other States. The present House of Representatives consist of one
hundred and eighty-one members, which are apportioned among the States
in a ratio of one representative for every thirty-five thousand federal
members, which are ascertained by adding to the whole number of free
persons, three-fifths of the slaves. According to the last census, the
whole number of slaves within the United was 1,191,364, which entitles
the States possessing the same to twenty representatives, and twenty
presidential electors more than they would be entitled to, were the
slaves excluded. By the last census, Virginia contained 582,104 free
persons, and 392,518 slaves. In any of the States where slavery is
excluded, 582,104 free persons would be entitled to elect only sixteen
representatives, while in Virginia, 582,104 free persons, by the
addition of three-fifths of her slaves, become entitled to elect, and do
in fact elect, twenty-three representatives, being seven additional ones
on account of her slaves. Thus, while 35,000 free persons are requisite
to elect one representative in a State where slavery is prohibited,
25,559 free persons in Virginia may and do elect a representative: so
that five free persons in Virginia have as much power in the choice
of Representatives to Congress, and in the appointment of presidential
electors, as seven free persons in any of the States in which slavery
does not exist.
This inequality in the apportionment of representatives was not
misunderstood at the adoption of the Constitution, but no one
anticipated the fact that the whole of the revenue of the United States
would be derived from indirect taxes (which cannot be supposed to
spread themselves over the several States according to the rule for the
apportionment of direct taxes), but it was believed that a part of
the contribution to the common treasury would be apportioned among the
States by the rule for the apportionment of representatives. The States
in which slavery is prohibited, ultimately, though with reluctance,
acquiesced in the disproportionate number of representatives and
electors that was secured to the slaveholding States. The concession
was, at the time, believed to be a great one, and has proved to
have been the greatest which was made to secure the adoption of the
Constitution.
Great, however, as this concession was, it was definite, and its full
extent was comprehended. It was a settlement between the original
thirteen States. The considerations arising out of their actual
condition, their past connection, and the obligation which all felt to
promote a reformation in the Federal Government, were peculiar to the
time and to the parties, and are not applicable to the new States, which
Congress may now be willing to admit into the Union.
The equality of rights, which includes an equality of burdens, is
a vital principle in our theory of government, and its jealous
preservation is the best security of public and individual freedom;
the departure from this principle in the disproportionate power and
influence, allowed to the slaveholding States, was a necessary sacrifice
to the establishment of the Constitution. The effect of this concession
has been obvious in the preponderance which it has given to the
slaveholding States over the other States. Nevertheless, it is an
ancient settlement, and faith and honor stand pledged not to disturb it.
But the extension of this disproportionate power to the new States would
be unjust and odious. The States whose power would be abridged, and
whose burdens would be increased by the measure, cannot be expected to
consent to it, and we may hope that the other States are too magnanimous
to insist on it.
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