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Page 11
The propositions or offers above-mentioned, were contained in two
bills brought into the British Parliament by Lord North, on the 17th
of February, 1778. Those bills were hurried through both houses with
unusual haste; and before they had gone through all the customary
forms of Parliament, copies of them were sent over to Lord Howe and
General Howe, then in Philadelphia, who were likewise Commissioners.
General Howe ordered them to be printed in Philadelphia, and sent
copies of them by a flag to General Washington, to be forwarded to
Congress at York-Town, where they arrived the 21st of April, 1778.
Thus much for the arrival of the bills in America.
Congress, as is their usual mode, appointed a committee from their own
body, to examine them, and report thereon. The report was brought in
the next day (the twenty-second,) was read, and unanimously agreed to,
entered on their journals, and published for the information of the
country. Now this report must be the rejection to which the Abbe
alludes, because Congress gave no other formal opinion on those bills
and propositions: and on a subsequent application from the British
Commissioners, dated the 27th of May, and received at York-Town the
6th of June, Congress immediately referred them for an answer, to
their printed resolves of the 22d of April.--Thus much for the
rejection of the offers.
On the 2d of May, that is, eleven days after the above rejection was
made, the treaty between the United States and France arrived at
York-Town; and until this moment Congress had not the least notice or
idea, that such a measure was in any train of execution. But lest this
declaration of mine should pass only for assertion, I shall support it
by proof, for it is material to the character and principle of the
revolution to shew, that no condition of America, since the
declaration of independence, however trying and severe, ever operated
to produce the most distant idea of yielding it up either by force,
distress, artifice, or persuasion. And this proof is the more
necessary, because it was the system of the British ministry at this
time, as well as before and since, to hold out to the European powers
that America was unfixt in her resolutions and policy; hoping by this
artifice to lessen her reputation in Europe, and weaken the confidence
which those powers, or any of them, might be inclined to place in her.
At the time these matters were transacting, I was Secretary to the
Foreign Department of Congress. All the political letters from the
American Commissioners rested in my hands, and all that were
officially written went from my office; and so far from Congress
knowing anything of the signing the treaty, at the time they rejected
the British offers, they had not received a line of information from
their Commissioners at Paris on any subject whatever for upwards of a
twelvemonth. Probably the loss of the port of Philadelphia, and the
navigation of the Delaware, together with the danger of the seas,
covered at this time with British cruizers, contributed to the
disappointment.
One packet, it is true, arrived at York-Town in January preceding,
which was about three months before the arrival of the treaty; but,
strange as it may appear, every letter had been taken out, before it
was put on board the vessel which brought it from France, and blank
white paper put in their stead.
Having thus stated the time when the proposals from the British
Commissioners were first received, and likewise the time when the
treaty of alliance arrived, and shewn that the rejection of the former
was eleven days prior to the arrival of the latter, and without the
least knowledge of such circumstance having taken place, or being
about to take place; the rejection, therefore, must, and ought to be
attributed to the fixt, unvaried sentiments of America respecting the
enemy she is at war with, and her determination to support her
independence to the last possible effort, and not to any new
circumstance in her favour, which at that time she did not, and could
not, know of.
Besides, there is a vigor of determination and spirit of defiance in
the language of the rejection (which I here subjoin), which derive
their greatest glory by appearing before the treaty was known; for
that, which is bravery in distress, becomes insult in prosperity: And
the treaty placed America on such a strong foundation, that had she
then known it, the answer which she gave would have appeared rather as
an air of triumph, than as the glowing serenity of fortitude.
Upon the whole, the Abbe appears to have entirely mistaken the matter;
for instead of attributing the rejection of the propositions to our
knowledge of the treaty of alliance; he should have attributed the
origin of them in the British cabinet, to their knowledge of that
event. And then the reason why they were hurried over to America in
the state of bills, that is, before they were passed into acts, is
easily accounted for, which is that they might have the chance of
reaching America before any knowledge of the treaty should arrive,
which they were lucky enough to do, and there met the fate they so
richly merited. That these bills were brought into the British
Parliament after the treaty with France was signed, is proved from the
dates: the treaty being on the 6th and the bills the 17th of February.
And that the signing the treaty was known in Parliament, when the
bills were brought in, is likewise proved by a speech of Mr. Charles
Fox, on the said 17th of February, who, in reply to Lord North,
informed the House of the treaty being signed, and challenged the
Minister's knowledge of the same fact.
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