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Page 7
The later development of biology, and the doctrine of the evolution of
species, gradually extended this conception of nature to include man
himself.
What he had regarded as his distinctive characteristics were held to be
but the product of natural factors, and his life was regarded, too, as
under the domain of rigid, inviolable law. There was no room for, and no
need of, the conception of free, originative thought. Thought was
simply an answer to the demand that the sense world was making, entirely
dependent upon the external stimulus, just as any other activity was
entirely dependent on an external stimulus. So thought came to be
regarded as resulting from mere sense impression, which latter
corresponded to the external stimulus. It is obvious that the idea of
the freedom of the human soul, and of human personality as previously
understood, had to go. Man was simply the result of the interaction of
numerous causes--and like the rest of nature, involved no independent
spiritual element. Everything that was previously regarded as spiritual
was interpreted as a mere adjunct to, or a shadow of, the sense world.
Such a conception accounted for the whole of nature and of man, and so
became an explanation of the universe, a philosophy.
In such a theory self-preservation becomes the aim of life, the struggle
for existence the driving-power, and adaptation to environment the means
to the desired end. Hence it comes about that only one standard of value
remains, that of usefulness, for that alone can be regarded as valuable
which proves to be useful towards the preservation and enjoyment of the
natural life. The ideas of the good, the beautiful, and the true, lose
the glory of their original meaning, and become comparatively barren
conceptions. Hence at a stroke the spiritual world is wiped away, the
soul of man is degraded from its high position, the great truths of
religion are cast aside as mere illusions.
The naturalistic explanation possesses the apparent advantage of being a
very simple one, and hence attracts the human mind with great force in
the early stages of mental culture. All the difficulties of the
conception of a higher world are absent, for the naturalistic position
does not admit of its existence. It gives, too, some purpose to life,
even though that purpose is not an ideal one.
Eucken is not reluctant to give the theory all the credit it deserves,
and he is prepared to admit that it fulfils to some extent the
conditions which he holds a satisfactory solution should fulfil.
He goes, however, immediately to the root of the matter, and finds that
the very existence of the theory of naturalism in itself is an eloquent
disproof of the theory. The existence of a comprehensive scientific
conception involves an activity which is far superior to nature itself,
for it can make nature the object of systematic study. An intellect
which is nothing more than a mirror of sense impressions can get little
beyond such sense impressions, whereas the highly developed scientific
conception of nature that obtains to-day is far beyond a mere collection
of sense impressions. Nature, indeed, is subdued and mastered by man;
why then degrade man to the level of a universe he has mastered? To
produce from the phenomena of nature a scientific conception of nature
demands the activity of an independent, originative power of thought,
which, though it may be conditioned by, and must be related to, sense
impressions, is far above mere sense impressions.
Naturalism, in directing attention to the things that are experienced,
fails to take proper account of the mind that experiences them; it
postulates nature without mind, when only by the mind processes can man
become aware of nature, and construct a naturalistic scheme of life. "To
a thorough-going naturalism, naturalism itself is logically impossible."
Hence the impossibility of the naturalistic theory as an explanation of
life.
Then it fails to provide a high ideal for life, and to release man from
sordid motives. It gives no place for love, for work for its own sake,
for altruistic conduct, or for devotion to the high ideals of life. The
aim of life is limited to this world--man has but to aim at the
enjoyment and preservation of his own life. The mechanical explanation
of life, too, does away with the possibility of human freedom and
personality, and it is futile to urge man to greater efforts when
success is impossible. It is a theory which does justice merely to a
life of pleasure and pain, its psychology has no soul, and its political
economy bases the community upon selfishness.
In this way Eucken disproves the claim of naturalism; in doing so he
points out that a satisfactory solution must take account of the life of
nature in a way which religion and idealism have failed to do.
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