|
Main
- books.jibble.org
My Books
- IRC Hacks
Misc. Articles
- Meaning of Jibble
- M4 Su Doku
- Computer Scrapbooking
- Setting up Java
- Bootable Java
- Cookies in Java
- Dynamic Graphs
- Social Shakespeare
External Links
- Paul Mutton
- Jibble Photo Gallery
- Jibble Forums
- Google Landmarks
- Jibble Shop
- Free Books
- Intershot Ltd
|
books.jibble.org
Previous Page
| Next Page
Page 11
What then can be done? Shall we despair? Never! The question is far too
urgent. To despair is to accept a policy that spells disaster to the
human race. The immediate environment is powerless to give life any real
meaning. We must probe deeper into the eternal--and it is from such
investigations that Eucken outlines a new theory of life.
But before we proceed to deal with Eucken's contribution to the problem,
it will be profitable to stay awhile to consider how it is that we can
obtain truth at all, and what are the tests that we can apply to truth
when we think we have attained it. It is the problem of the possibility
of knowledge, really, that we have to discuss in brief. Eucken himself
does not pay much direct attention to this difficult question, for, as
has been already pointed out, he refuses to be drawn from his main
problem. It is impossible, however, to appreciate Eucken without
understanding clearly the position he takes up in this matter.
What is truth? How can we know?--these are entrancing problems for the
profound thinker, and have been written upon frequently and at great
length. But we can do little more at present than give the barest
outline of the positions that have been taken up. Every search for truth
must assume a certain position in this matter; in studying Eucken's
philosophy it is of the first importance--more so perhaps than in the
case of most other philosophers--to keep in mind clearly from the outset
the position he implicitly assumes.
The simplest theory of knowledge is that of _Empiricism_, which holds
that all knowledge must be gained through experience of the outside
world, and of our mental states. We see a blue wall, we obtain through
our eyes an impression of blueness, and are able to make a statement:
"This wall is blue." This, of course, is one of the simplest assertions
that can be made, and consists merely in assigning a term--"blue"--the
meaning of which has already been agreed upon, to a colour that we
appear to see on a wall. The test of the truth of this assertion is a
simple one--it is true if it corresponds with fact. If the same
assertion is made in regard to a red wall, then it is obviously untrue.
Our sense impressions give rise to a great variety of such expressions.
We state "the wall is blue" as a result of an impression obtained
through the organs of sight; then we speak of a pungent smell, a sweet
taste, a harsh sound, or a rough stone, on account of impressions
received respectively through the organs of smell, taste, hearing, and
touch. But, of course, all such assertions are superficial in
character--there is little more in them than the application of a
conventional term to an observed phenomenon, they avail us little in
solving the mysteries of the universe.
Strictly speaking, this is for the empiricist the limit of possible
knowledge, but he would be a poor investigator who would be content with
this and no more. The empiricist tries to go a distinct step in advance
of this. The scientist observing the path of a planet travelling round
the sun, finds that its course is that of an ellipse. He studies the
path of a second planet, and finds that this also travels along an
elliptical orbit. Later he finds that all planets he is able to observe
travel in the same kind of path--then he hazards a general statement,
and says, "All planets travel round their suns in elliptical orbits."
But now he has left the realm of certainty for that of uncertainty.
There may be innumerable planets which he cannot observe that take a
different course. He hazards the general statement, because he assumes
(sometimes without knowing that he does so) that nature is uniform and
constant, that it will do to-day as it did yesterday, and does in
infinite space as it does in the visible universe.
The knowledge that is possible to the empiricist, then, is merely that
which is derived from direct experience, and simple summations or
generalisations into a single assertion of a number of similar
assertions, all of which were individually derived from experience. This
is the position scientists as such, and believers in the theory of
naturalism, take up as to the possibility of the knowledge of truth to
the human mind. They are entirely consistent, therefore, when they
arrive ultimately at the agnostic position, and contend that our
knowledge must necessarily be confined to the world of experience, and
that nothing can be known of the world beyond. But they are
fundamentally wrong in overestimating the place of the sense organs, and
forgetting that while these have a part to play in life, they do not
constitute the whole of life.
A far more satisfactory theory is that of _Rationalism_. It
is a theory that admits that the human mind has some capacity for
working upon the data presented to it by the sense organs. Man is
no longer quite so helpless a creature as empiricism would make
him. He is able to weigh and consider the facts that are presented
to the mind. The method rationalism uses to arrive at truth is that
of logical deduction, and the test of truth is that the steps in the
process are logically sound. We may start from the data "All dogs
are animals" and "Carlo is a dog," and arrive very simply at the
conclusion "Carlo is an animal." The conclusion is correct because
we have reasoned in accordance with the laws of logic, with the laws
of valid thought. All logical reasoning is, of course, not so simple
as the example given, but it may be stated generally that when there
is no logical fallacy, a correct conclusion may be arrived at,
provided, too--and herein lies the difficulty--provided that the
premises are also true. These premises may be in themselves general
statements--how is their truth established? They may be, and often
are, the generalisations of the empirical sciences, and must then
possess the same degree of uncertainty that these generalisations
possess. Some philosophers have contended that certain general ideas
are innate, but few would be found nowadays to accept such a
contention. At other times mere definitions of terms may serve as
premises. One might state as a premise the definition "A straight
line is the shortest distance between two points," and the further
statement that "AB is a straight line between A and B," and conclude
that the line AB represents the shortest distance between two points A
and B. In a manner similar to this Euclid built his whole mathematical
system upon the basis of definitions and postulates, a system the
complexity and thoroughness of which has caused all students of
mathematics at one time or another to marvel and admire. But, of
course, a definition is little more than assigning a definite term to
a definite thing. It is when we begin to consider the premises that are
necessary for arriving at the profound truths of the universe that we
find the weakness of rationalism. How are we going to be provided with
premises for this end? Shall we begin by saying "There is a God" or
"There is no God"? How is the pure reasoning faculty to decide upon the
premises in the matter of the great Beyond? We may weigh the arguments
for and against a certain position, and we may think that the probability
lies in a certain direction, but to decide finally and with certainty
by mere cold logical reasoning is impossible. We may bring out into
prominence through logical reasoning truths that were previously only
implicit, but to arrive at absolute truth with regard to the invisible
world, through intellect alone, has long been admitted to be an
impossibility. The illusion of those who would believe that truth which
was not already implied in the premises could ever be obtained by mere
intellectual reasoning has long since been dispelled.
Previous Page
| Next Page
|
|